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ABSTRACT: This article examines negligent infliction of emotional
distress, one of the most controversial and least uniform fields of tort law. A
review of the judicial and scholarly literature has shown that traditional
tort analysis fails. In its stead, the common law has not found an alternative
theory of liability that balances the competing interests. Rather, the
approach has been to create rules of law based on probabilistic templates.
Its dual purpose is to preclude individualized analysis and to limit
aggregate liability. This article rejects the current doctrines as inherently
arbitrary and proposes a complete overhaul of the law. To find a more
principled solution, the notion of duty must be reconceptualized beyond
arbitrary divisions and foreseeability of risk. Because of the unpredictable
nature of mental injuries and its consequences on the application of the
rules of law, the concepts of duty andforeseeability must be distinguished in
finer gradations. The formulation of duty should be a dynamic calculus that
considers the plaintiff's interests, the defendant's culpability, and the social
policy considerations. When such analysis is engaged, it is entirely possible
for a more principled theory to coexist with the practical policy of limiting
liability. This approach requires that the rules of liability and damage be
adjusted to reflect the interests and culpabilities at issue.
I. INTRODUCTION
Negligent infliction of emotional distress is one of the most important
fields of tort law, not because it has the greatest social impact but because it
involves a significant interest for which the law is in an "unparalleled state
of confusion."1 Although mental injuries can be as real and severe as
physical ones, the law dealing with this interest is anything but principled or
uniform. This inadequacy is particularly glaring since the general theories
of negligence and accident law are well established in American
jurisprudence.2 After one hundred years of judicial and scholarly analyses,
nearly all states recognize a right to recover for negligent infliction of
1. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Right to Recover for Emotional Disturbance or Its Physical
Consequences, in the Absence of Impact or Other Actionable Wrong, 64 A.L.R.2D 100, 103
(1959); see Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 442 (Wis. 1994) ("The
nearly 60 years of court decisions since Waube demonstrate that rigid doctrinal limitations on
liability to bystanders produce arbitrary, incongruous and indefensible results.").
2. Negligence as a tort theory took root during the early nineteenth century. Percy H.
Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 L.Q. REv. 184, 195 (1926).
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emotional distress in some form or another But from this single root, the
jurisdictions have branched off into a tangled array of rules in an effort to
balance the twin goals of remedying injured plaintiffs and limiting liability
to socially tolerable levels.4 Although these rules have generally succeeded
in the latter goal, they have done so by drawing arbitrary bright lines. The
criticism has been legion,5 and even courts at the highest levels have
candidly conceded the arbitrary nature of these rules.6 The current disarray
in an important field of tort law stems from a conflict of competing policies.
First, mental and physical injuries differ.7 Broken bones, ruptured
kidneys, and viral infections can be objectively verified whereas mental
injuries elude empirical testing.8 Physical injuries and their causes obey
certain immutable laws of natural science, whereas the etiology of mental
injuries does not conform to neat equations or expectations. Yet few in
modem society would question that mental injuries can be as severe and
3. See Douglas Bryan Marlowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A
Jurisdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of
Objective Versus Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REv. 781, 792-93 & n.59 (1988).
4. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REv.
1625, 1633, 1660 (2002) ("[A]nalysis of this area is rife with confusion."). Courts have
employed an array of concepts such as "parasitic damage," "impact," "zone of danger,"
"direct/indirect," and "bystander." Id. at 1633; see infra Part II, pp. 813-31 and accompanying
notes.
5. See infra notes 66, 144 for some of the academic commentary on this subject.
6. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994) (acknowledging
that "[p]erhaps the zone of danger test is 'arbitrary' while adopting the rule nevertheless);
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828 (Cal. 1989) ("[W]e acknowledge (there] must be
arbitrary lines to similarly limit the class of potential plaintiffs."); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d
372, 381 (N.J. 1994) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) ("[A] certain degree of arbitrariness is necessary
in setting the outer limits of liability in the field of emotional distress in particular.").
7. Throughout this article, "mental injury" is shorthand for severe mental or emotional
injury, and not trivial or evanescent injury, associated with living in an imperfect world. Courts
and commentators generally agree that only serious injuries are compensable and that minor
injuries such as hurt feelings, temporary fright, and ordinary stress should not be recognized.
See, e.g., Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 380 (3d Cir. 1993) (claims for trivial
emotional disturbances are not cognizable); Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 583
(1982) (recovery should be limited to genuine and severe mental injuries); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A & cmt. c (1965) (stating mental distress from
negligence applies "to all forms of emotional disturbance, including temporary fright, nervous
shock, nausea, grief, rage, and humiliation"); id. at § 46 cmt. j (same for intentional tort). But
see Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L.
REv. 333, 382-91 (1984) (suggesting a nominal fixed dollar amount of $400-$500 for trivial
mental injuries). It is beyond the scope of this article to define the medical and psychological
nature of a genuine mental injury. See infra note 149. I leave this to the courts and factfinders.
8. See infra pp. 832-33 and accompanying notes.
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devastating as physical ones,9 and advances in the mental health profession
have legitimized these injuries as genuine harms otherwise worthy of legal
recognition. 0
Second, because mental injuries are difficult to verify, courts are
naturally wary of opening the floodgates to fraudulent, frivolous, and
perhaps even marginal lawsuits." Yet such arguments have been described
by Prosser as "threshing old straw."' 2 Frivolous lawsuits are endemic to the
entire legal system and the concern over fraud and frivolity, though
unquestionably legitimate, must be tempered by the principle that for every
wrong the law should provide a remedy.1
Third, physical injuries are generally inflicted only when the negligent
act delivers sufficient force or harmful agent to cause injuries. In most
ordinary accidents, such injuries are localized to the time and place of the
accident and obey certain natural laws of science.14 The concept of
foreseeability is driven in part by our understanding and expectation of
accidents and their consequences, and the predictability of accidents is
essential to assign culpability as well as to provide appropriate deterrence.
But mental injuries have a transient quality about them, and they are not
9. See Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 113 (Ohio 1983) ("Emotional
injury can be as severe and debilitating as physical harm and is deserving of redress.").
10. From the early twentieth century, scholars recognized that mental injuries were worthy
of legal protection. See ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 120-21 (1923)
("With the rise of modem psychology the basis of this caution in securing an important element
of the interest of personality was removed."); see also Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616
P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980) ("That medical science and particularly the field of mental health
have made much progress in the 20th century is manifest"); Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins.
Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 470, 481 (Ct. App. 1975) (considering an emotional distress as trivial is an
"antiquated concept," and mental trauma can be just as debilitating as physical injuries) (citing
POUND, supra, at 120); Leslie Benton Sandor & Carol Berry, Recovery for Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 1247,
1255 (1995) (finding that, based on advances in modern psychology, mental trauma can be just
as debilitating as physical injury).
11. See Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 545 (expressing concern of "a flood of relatively trivial
claims" due to the etiology of mental injuries) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 569-70 & n.20 (1987).
12. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 360
(5th student ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
13. The maxim of English law, ubi jus, ibi remedium, states that "for every right, there
must be a remedy." Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333, 343 (Or. 2001) (citing
JAMES DEWITT ANDREWS, AMERICAN LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE JURISPRUDENCE,
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 590 (2d ed. 1908)); see OKLA. CONST. art. II,
§ 6 (providing a remedy for every wrong); WIs. CONST. art. I, § 9 (same). The law of negligent
infliction of emotional distress has modified this general maxim "to limit the legal consequences
of wrongs to a controllable degree." Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969).
14. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 407 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
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localized to time and space proximity. The vagaries of each person's mental
and emotional fortitude come into play. Horrendous circumstances may
result in no lasting injury or evanescent harm. Yet slight abuse may cause
significant injuries across a wide swath of victims, and so there is the
possibility of limitless and unpredictable liability.
Each of the above considerations is legitimate in its own right, but
collectively their tug and pull have offered little guidance for courts to
fashion value neutral, practical, and principled rules of law that provide
remedies across a broad spectrum of foreseeable plaintiffs while limiting
liability to defendants. Over the years, the law has struggled to strike the
proper balance, producing a chronicle of "false starts."15 The end result was
not a reasoned compromise, but a series of compromised rules. This flaw is
evinced by the common law's16 adoption at various times of the physical
impact, physical manifestation, zone of danger, and bystander tests (in all of
their various flavors).17 While different in formulation, these rules share a
common trait: they define a specific situation under which a plaintiff could
be injured and then affix liability within the confines of that situational
template, excluding all other possibilities with the purpose of precluding a
case-by-case analysis. 8  If these probabilistic templates covered
substantially all of the reasonably foreseeable situations in which plaintiffs
could be injured, the debate would be merely academic. In the procession of
human events, however, the set of factual circumstances resulting in injury
is literally infinite. Without a more principled theory to assign culpability
and distribute remedies, the law will continue to exist as random islands of
liability in a sea of arbitrary preclusion. 9
15. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 831 (Cal. 1989) (Kaufman, J., concurring) (quoting
Nolan & Ursin, supra note 7, at 604); see Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 924 (Cal. 1968) (noting
that the history of negligent infliction of emotional distress does not show the development of a
principled rule but rather "a series of changes and abandonments"); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646
S.W.2d 765, 771 (Mo. 1983) ("Further study made it apparent that the requirement of physical
injury resulting from the emotional distress merely meant the replacement of one arbitrary,
artificial rule with another which was only somewhat less restrictive.").
16. Reference to the "common law" is shorthand for the laws of the various states. By this
I do not suggest that the common law acts in the singular or is unified in thought. See Gottshall,
512 U.S. at 571-72 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The 'common law' of emotional distress
exists not in the singular, but emphatically in the plural."). Indeed, I write this article because
the common law exists in a state of arbitrary pluralism.
17. See infra Part II, pp. 813-31 and accompanying notes. In addition to these tests, the
common law has recognized other special circumstances where liability can be found, including
miscommunication of death notices and fear of disease cases. See infra notes 44-45.
18. See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 436 (1997) (noting that
the purpose of common law rules was to "deny courts the authority to undertake a case-by-case
examination").
19. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 925.
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Although the common law rules have the advantage of drawing bright
lines-enabling mechanical application of rules to facts and sharply limiting
liability to the general populace-they do little to distinguish real injuries
from the feigned, weigh culpability against the interest violated, and
allocate appropriate risks and remedies. In a judicial system founded on
reason and fairness, the price of arbitrary rules is high, particularly when
courts "freely" admit their rules are really judicial fiats.2" Under this system,
the difference between remedy and claim preclusion in an action involving
genuine injuries depends on the jurisdiction's rule of law, the application of
which may turn on such inconsequential vagaries as the distance of a "few
yards" or the lapsing of a "few minutes."21
In this field, the formulation of duty is the core problem. Duty in
negligence actions is substantially defined by foreseeability of risk as
measured by the reasonably prudent person. This is the traditional doctrine
under Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., which was devised to limit
liability to "within the range of apprehension."22 Under the general rule, a
defendant has a duty of care to not cause physical injury to a foreseeable
plaintiff.23 Ironically, for mental injury claims, Palsgraf opens the Pandora's
Box of limitless liability because so many mental injury claims are easily
foreseeable.24 So courts and commentators have framed the issue this way:
How should the law deal with the entire class of genuinely injured,
foreseeable plaintiffs in a way that appropriately limits liability? This
question rests on two assumptions: (1) foreseeability defines, in part at least,
duty and thus these plaintiffs should be entitled to full remedies but for the
social policy considerations; and (2) a defendant's conduct, once found to
fall short of the reasonably prudent standard, is linked to the determination
of liability only under a causation analysis and does not bear on defining
20. Thing, 771 P.2d at 831 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
21. See, e.g., Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915 (noting the arbitrariness of the zone of danger test
that delineates liability based on a difference of a few yards); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 137 Cal. Rptr.
619 (Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting a claim because the mother arrives at the scene of an accident
three minutes later); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Wis. 1994)
(allowing a cause of action for a mother who arrived at the scene a "few minutes" after the
accident).
22. 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.); see infra pp. 847-53 and accompanying
notes for a discussion of the case. See generally William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52
MICH. L. REv. 1 (1953) (discussing the case).
23. See infra note 228, discussing the acceptance of the Palsgraf doctrine in American
jurisprudence.
24. Various courts and judges have used the Pandora's Box metaphor in the context of
analyzing these claims. See, e.g., Rowell v. Holt, 850 So.2d 474, 480 (Fla. 2003); S. Cent. Reg'l
Med. Ctr. v. Pickering, 749 So.2d 95, 100 (Miss. 1999); Winslow v. Mont. Rail Link, Inc., 38
P.3d 148, 153 (Mont. 2001) (Trieweiler, J., dissenting); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 220 A.2d 646, 647
(Pa. 1966), overruled by Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1970).
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duty or damages. When the issue is framed in this manner, there is no
solution other than drawing bright lines. It is an all-or-arbitrary choice.
A principled solution is built only on a sound theoretical foundation,
which may require an alternative construct to the traditional approach when
the underlying assumptions no longer hold. The problem is that courts have
continued to analyze mental injuries through a physical injury prism. Courts
and scholars have viewed reasonable foreseeability and negligent
culpability as singular concepts without distinction. But mental injuries
differ in etiological and behavioral properties, and so these differences
should be considered when fashioning rules of law that reflect the operative
reality. Although Palsgraf begot the problem by framing duty in terms of
foreseeability, the opinion also hints at the solution.25 This article rejects the
notion that foreseeability and interest in freedom from mental injuries are
singular concepts. Judge Cardozo's key insight was that duty is a term of
relation and foreseeability alone need not be the sole determinant.26 A
reconceptualization of duty requires distinctions beyond foreseeability.
With this fresh canvas, it is entirely possible to sketch the limits of
liability and remedies around the entire class of injured plaintiffs-and,
importantly, do so in a more principled manner than under the current all-
or-arbitrary scheme. As a first step, this article rejects the situational
rulemaking approach of the past one hundred years because such a
framework is inherently arbitrary, precluding as a matter of law a broad
spectrum of injured plaintiffs. Nor does tinkering around the margins
suffice to fix an interminably broken model. This article also rejects the a
priori assumption that all foreseeable plaintiffs should be entitled to whole
relief.27 Rather, it defines duty as the relationship between defendant's
culpability and plaintiffs diversity of interests. Claims for mental injuries
must be evaluated on a three-part, sliding-scale calculus: an examination of
the foreseeable victim's interests, a focus on the defendant's culpability,
and society's need to place tolerable limits on liability. This analysis
necessitates changes to both the rules of liability and damage, resulting in a
more principled liability allocation and remedy distribution.28
Based on these guiding principles, the following rules of law are
proposed: (1) for all direct victims (i.e., where the primacy of the wrongful
25. See infra pp. 851-53 and accompanying notes.
26. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
27. See infra note 356.
28. Rules of damage determine the remedies available. Richard N. Pearson, Liability to
Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary
Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477, 485 (1982). Rules of liability determine the substantive rules
under which liability may or may not be created. Id.
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conduct was directed at the victim affecting her safety or well-being), the
traditional tort laws of liability and damage should apply; (2) for all other
foreseeable, collateral victims (i.e., where the injury arises from the
knowledge of harm to another), they are entitled to relief only if the
defendant's conduct is reckless or more, and only to the limit of economic
out-of-pocket losses.
This distinction is made because plaintiffs' interests are different. For
direct victims, the interest derives from a fundamental right of self-
preservation (the right to be), which undergirds tort law. For collateral
victims, their true interest is the safety or well-being of others, which is a
derivative right based upon an injury to the primary victims. For this reason
and because direct victims are closer in causal proximity to the tortious act,
the former is a higher order interest for which a defendant should be liable
upon a finding of simple negligence.29 Accordingly, legal culpability should
reflect these differences. This general theory of liability navigates the
narrow isthmus of limiting liability and imposing a more principled general
theory of duty of care.3" Under this analysis, duty is defined in a manner
where no foreseeable plaintiff is precluded as a matter of law but where
liability is well defined, and in no small measure by the defendant's
culpability.
This proposal is not ideal, if providing remedies to all is the yardstick.
Apportioning liability is a zero-sum allocation between plaintiffs and
defendants. Because legal remedies are not an infinite resource,3 the issues
at stake are: How large should the pool of remedies be? And how should
this pool be apportioned among plaintiffs? The -first question deals with
liability theory, the one constant in the ever changing field of tort law. The
vexing question of liability's limit has produced the all-or-arbitrary choice
and the legion of scholarship commenting on that choice.32 The second
question addresses the distributive theory of remedies, i.e., whether it is fair
to provide full remedies to some injured plaintiffs and not to others based
on arbitrary divisions of liability and preclusion. Under the current scheme,
remedies are an all-or-nothing distribution. Surprisingly, few scholars have
directly analyzed this distribution scheme.33 Like most difficult legal
29. See infra Part IV.B, pp. 853-61.
30. Reference in this article to a "general theory of liability" simply means a principled
system of rules. The common law rules are not based on general theories of liability, but are
special rules of exception to the presumption of nonliability.
31. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,435-36 (1997).
32. See infra notes 66, 144.
33. Most scholars have only analyzed this issue indirectly in the context of determining
the scope of liability. Accepting that the amount of remedies is limited as the legal marketplace
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problems, there is no perfect solution in this field, only tradeoffs seeking
optimality among the various stakeholders.34 In this regard, a completely
satisfactory solution is elusive, as the law must make normative distinctions
among varying interests in a world of limited resources. The question is
whether the tradeoffs are justified by sound principles and fairness.
1I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW
The development of the law in this field has been well documented by
commentators and this article will not repeat a detailed history. 5 Nor is the
purpose of this article to conduct a jurisdictional survey of the law.36 This
article reviews some of the seminal cases in California, Hawaii, and the
federal courts. California and Hawaii have been at the forefront of
recognizing new theories for mental distress claims,37 and recently federal
courts have reviewed the collective common law and fashioned a uniform
rule under Supreme Court auspice.38 Thus, the laws in these jurisdictions
reflect the leading judicial trends and thoughts in this field, and they provide
a basis for this discussion.
A. Early Common Law
Early common law did not recognize claims for mental injuries from
negligent acts. " Mental injuries were assumed to be different from physical
has determined, few commentators have analyzed the distribution of remedies among the
plaintiff class in the context of this limitation.
34. Some legal problems have more than one logical solution, and there is no logical way
to choose between them. See Pearson, supra note 28, at 482.
35. See generally John H. Bauman, Emotional Distress Damages and the Tort of
Insurance Bad Faith, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 717 (1998); Bell, supra note 7; David Crump,
Evaluating Independent Torts Based upon "Intentional" or "Negligent" Infliction of Emotional
Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV.
439 (1992); Nolan & Ursin, supra note 7, at 583; Pearson, supra note 28.
36. See Marlowe, supra note 3, at 781.
37. See Richard S. Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the Crime," 1 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 3 & n.22 (1979);
Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1515 n.7 (1985); Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1247; Michael Jay
Gorback, Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Has the Legislative Response to
Diane Whipple's Death Rendered the Hard-Line Stance of Elden and Thing Obsolete?, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 273, 273 (2002).
38. See infra Part I.C, pp. 823-31 and accompanying notes.
39. See Pamela Cogan Thigpen, Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: New
Horizons After Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 13 PAC. L.J. 179, 181 (1981); see also
Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861) ("Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value,
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ones, and claimants were deemed less worthy of legal protection.4" Thejustifications for denying these claims are the same policy reasons giving
today's courts pause: mental injuries are incalculable, they will lead to a
flood of litigation and unlimited liability, they are not proximally related to
the defendants' conduct, they are unpredictable, they are the idiosyncratic
reactions of less balanced individuals, they are easier to fake or exaggerate,
and their damages are speculative.4 Most of these reasons have long been
discredited.42 But for years courts have dealt with the problem by denying
most mental injury claims, and even modem courts still express a certain
distrust of these claims.43
The preclusion of a claim was not absolute. Even early common law
courts carved out special circumstances where the egregiousness of the facts
could not be overlooked and provided indicia of genuineness, such as the
mishandling of corpses and miscommunication of a loved one's death or
illness.4 These claims were handled on an ad hoc basis, and the results were
driven more by a visceral sense of justice than any pretensions of a
principled approach toward the larger problem. Indeed, even modem courts
and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone ... 
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 12, at 55 ("Not until comparatively recent decades has the
infliction of mental distress served as [an independent tort].").
40. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 354 (N.Y. 1896), overruled by
Battalla v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961).
41. See PROSSER & KEETON supra note 12, § 54, at 360; Colleen Wilcox Heidenreich,
Comment, Clarifying California's Approach to Claims of Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 277, 283 (1995).
42. Prosser concludes that mental injury is no more difficult to calculate than physical
pain; it is not an independent intervening cause, and its consequence can follow directly from
negligence; and the law does not protect physical health alone. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
12, § 54, at 360. As discussed later in this article, the key concern is the potential for unlimited
and unpredictable liability, which is a legitimate concern. See infra Part III.B, pp. 836-42 and
accompanying notes.
43. See, e.g., Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 165 N.W.2d 259, 263-64 (Minn. 1969)
(granting relief under zone of danger test when a wall collapsed at a construction site near
plaintiff "notwithstanding her unusual susceptibility to the consequences of her fear").
44. See, e.g., Chelini v. Nieri, 196 P.2d 915, 917 (Cal. 1948) (negligent casket sealing);
Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 335 P.2d 181, 183 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (negligent
embalming); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 129 So. 743, 747 (Fla. 1930) (negligent
transmission of medical results); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., 538 A.2d 346, 353(N.J. 1988) (negligent handling of corpse); Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813-14 (N.C.
1949) (negligent treatment of corpse); Russ v. W. Union Tel. Co., 23 S.E.2d 681, 683 (N.C.
1943) (negligent failure to transmit death notice); So Relle v. W. Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308,
313 (1881) (negligent transmission of death notice), overruled by Gulf, Chi. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563 (1883).
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have taken a similar ad hoc approach when faced with new situations for
which the traditional framework of tort law fails to provide a neat solution.45
Eventually, the law began to recognize mental injury claims in limited
ways. As early as 1896, California compensated mental suffering as an
aggravation of damages for physical injuries.4 6 These claims were said to be
"parasitic" to an independent cause of action for physical injuries, property
damages, or contractual rights in most cases.47 At the turn of the century,
courts started to create narrow rules of independent liability. One such rule
allowed recovery where the mental injury manifested into discernable
physical symptoms. 48 Also, since at least 1897, courts began to apply the
"physical impact" rule, under which a plaintiff seeking damages for mental
45. For example, there is a line of cases dealing with mental injuries from exposure to
harmful agents or disease pathogens, creating special circumstances under which courts have
granted relief See, e.g., Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1993) (exposure to
toxins); Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Potter v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993) (fear of future disease); Herbert v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709 (Ct. App. 1994) (fear of future AIDS and cancer). But see
Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 512 U.S. 424 (1997) (FELA case); Eagle-Picher
Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (fear of future cancer). The "fear
of disease" and "cancerphobia" cases are really claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. See Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252 (N.Y. 1958) (allowing a claim for
"cancerphobia".-"Freedom from mental disturbance is now a protected interest in this State.");
see also Kira Elert, Note, Dillon v. Evanston Hospital: Illinois Adopts the New Increased Risk
Doctrine Governing Recovery for Future Injury, 34 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 685, 706 (2003). See
generally Glen Donath, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia: Reasonableness Redefined, 62 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1113 (1995). Like the earlier cases involving erroneous death notices and negligent
handling of corpses, see supra note 44, these cases are best understood as visceral responses to
particularly egregious cases in which the facts provide a special indicia of genuineness. The
continued reliance on such patchwork justice is precisely why a general theory of liability is
needed.
46. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980) (citing Sloane v. S.
Cal. Ry. Co., 44 P. 320, 322 (Cal. 1896)); see State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240
P.2d 282, 285-86 (Cal. 1952); Deevy v. Tassi, 130 P.2d 389, 395-96 (Cal. 1942); see also Hill
v. Kimball, 13 S.W. 59, 60 (Tex. 1890) (discussing the issue of independent claims for mental
injuries).
47. Mary Donovan, Comment, Is the Injury Requirement Obsolete in a Claim for Fear of
Future Consequnces?, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1337, 1350 (1994). See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs,
437 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Mass. 1982); Martinez v. Teague, 631 P.2d 1314, 1319 (N.M. Ct. App.
1981); Hammond v. Cent. Lane Communications Ctr., 816 P.2d 593, 596 (Or. 1991); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 54, at 363 ("With a cause of action established by the
physical harm, 'parasitic' damages are awarded, and it is considered that there is sufficient
assurance that the mental injury is not feigned.").
48. See, e.g., Webb v. Francis J. Lewald Coal Co., 4 P.2d 532, 533 (Cal. 1931); Sloane v.
So. Cal. Ry. Co., 44 P. 320, 322-24 (Cal. 1896). Some modem courts still adhere to the
physical manifestation rule. See, e.g., Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 730 A.2d 1086, 1092-93
(Vt. 1999).
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injuries must show a contemporaneous physical impact, however slight. 9
Toward the early twentieth century, most major industrial states adopted the
physical impact test.50
The physical manifestation and physical impact tests were crude
screening devices to weed out fraudulent and frivolous claims.51 But almost
from inception, these rules proved unsatisfactory. Consider, for instance, the
physical impact rule. The rule has been criticized for being inherently
arbitrary. 2 It is underinclusive because other victims who did not suffer an
impact are clearly foreseeable, but remedy is denied. It is also overinclusive
because victims who sustained an impact may recover where there was no
genuine mental injury. The logical nexus between impact, a physical event,
and mental injury is tenuous at best. So in cases where the injury was
severe, courts stretched the meaning of impact to the point of eviscerating
the element in the pursuit of heartstring justice. Impact has been held to be a
slight blow, an electric shock, a trivial jolt, a forcible seating, dust in the
eye, inhalation of smoke, and a horse's defecation on the victim. 3 Such
strained logic to achieve humanitarian ends effectively undermined the
legitimacy of the rule itself, and courts soon looked for other alternatives in
search of a more principled approach." Most jurisdictions have since
abandoned the physical impact test.55
49. The leading early physical impact cases were Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 47
N.E. 88 (Mass. 1897) and Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896).
Subsequently, both New York and Massachusetts, as with most states, abandoned the impact
rule. See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296-1301 (Mass. 1978); Battalla v. State,
176 N.E.2d 729, 729-32 (N.Y. 1961).
50. Archibald Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REv. 260, 263-64 & n.25
(1921); Heidenreich, supra note 41, at 284; see, e.g., Spade, 47 N.E. at 89; Mitchell, 45 N.E. at
355; Ewing v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co., 23 A. 340, 340 (Pa. 1892). But
see R.J. v. Humana of Fla., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995) (adhering to the physical impact
test); Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 533 S.E.2d 82, 83-87 (Ga. 2000) (same).
51. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 917 (Cal. 1968) (stating that a denial of duty rests
upon the prevention of fraudulent claims); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 175 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1961) (finding that the purpose of the physical impact rule is to prevent "illusory" or "faked"
claims); Waube v. Warrington, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 1935) (recognizing bystander liability
would lead to fraudulent claims); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 54, at 363 (stating that
the impact rule is based on a desired guarantee that the mental injury is genuine). But see
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532,. 552 (1994) (finding the concern underlying the
common law tests dealt with limiting liability and had "nothing to do with the potential for
fraudulent claims").
52. See Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 937 F.2d 1004, 1009 (5th Cir. 1991) ("This rule has
been criticized . as being arbitrarily underinclusive for there are genuine mental injuries that
are not accompanied by a physical injury or impact.").
53. PROSSER& KEETON, supra note 12, § 54, at 363-64.
54. See Rickey v. Chi. Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 1983) ("A significant reason for
[the rule's] loss of adherents was that courts quickly began to find that the impact requirement
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Around the same time that the impact test was being adopted, the
common law was also experimenting with the zone of danger test.56 This
test permits recovery for mental injuries resulting from witnessing harm to
another or from fearing harm to oneself, provided, however, she was in the
physical proximity of potential harm.57 One of the leading cases is Waube v.
Warrington.58 There, a mother witnessed her daughter being struck and
killed by a car, and the resulting shock led to mental injury and later her
untimely death (the classic bystander scenario as later developed by the
California Supreme Court).59 The estate sued for negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the injury was
"out of the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of
witnessing another's danger."6 The court relied on Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R. Co., decided seven years earlier, for the principle that a defendant's
duty was to use ordinary care to avoid foreseeable physical injuries."
Because even physical injury claims are limited to a certain physical zone of
danger, the logic went, so too should mental injury claims.62 Thus, Palsgraf
had been met through minor physical contacts which in reality were insignificant and played
trivial or no part in causing harm to the plaintiff.").
55. See, e.g., id. at 5 (abandoning the physical impact test); Bass v. Nooney Co., 646
S.W.2d 765, 772-73 (Mo. 1983) (same); Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 110
(Ohio 1983); see also Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547 (counting only five states that still adhere to
this rule) (citing OB-GYN Assocs. of Albany v. Littleton, 386 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. 1989);
Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991); Anderson v. Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667
(Kan. 1988); Deutsch v. Shein, 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980); Hammond v. Cent. Lane
Communications Ctr., 816 P.2d 593 (Or. 1991)).
56. Dissatisfaction with the physical impact test led to the development of the zone of
danger test. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 438 (Wis. 1994). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that as of 1987 the majority of jurisdictions have adopted the
zone of danger test. Id. (citing Gillman v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 673 F. Supp. 913, 917 n.1
(N.D. Ill. 1987)).
57. Heidenreich, supra note 41, at 286. The zone of danger test is set forth in the
Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(2) (1965). See generally Francis H.
Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 50 AM. L. REG.
141 & nn.3-5 (1902) (discussing the "zone of danger" test).
58. 258 N.W. 497 (Wis. 1935), overruled by Bowen, 517 N.W.2d at 439; see Calvert
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033,
1040-45 (1936) (discussing the significance of Waube v. Washington, and the influence of
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. on Waube and its significance on negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
59. See infra pp. 818-21 and accompanying notes.
60. Waube, 258 N.W. at 501.
61. Id. at 498, 501 (relying on Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y.
1928)).
62. This reliance on Palsgraf was not entirely misplaced. Palsgraf spoke in terms of "risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to
another or to others within the range of apprehension." 162 N.E. at 100. There, physical
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was the doctrinal precursor to the zone of danger test. The court further
reasoned that "the liability imposed by such a doctrine is wholly out of
proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor... and enter[s] a
field that has no sensible or just stopping point."63 This concern is as current
today as it was when Waube was decided in 1935.
Like the physical impact and physical manifestation rules, the zone of
danger test does not provide remedies to all foreseeable plaintiffs. 64 It was
adopted as the next generation rule that marginally expanded liability
beyond the previous rules and perhaps was arguably more principled. But
the zone of danger rule, too, is a crude screening device suffering from the
same flaws as its predecessor. Currently, a minority of jurisdictions have
adopted the zone of danger test and, interestingly, so too has the Supreme
Court in creating a uniform federal common law.65
B. The Bystander Test
In 1968, the law took a dramatic turn when the California Supreme Court
decided Dillon v. Legg.6 6 The facts were simple: a mother was crossing the
proximity was the key factual distinction. See infra pp. 849-50 and accompanying notes. But
the notion of risk importation means that certain risks extend beyond physical proximity, though
in most ordinary accidents the risks are confined to a physical proximity. See infra pp. 839-40
and accompanying notes. Palsgraf did not stand for the proposition that a defendant owes a duty
of care to those in the zone of physical danger. Instead, it held that a defendant owes a duty of
care to a foreseeable plaintiff, which in this case involved some form of a physical zone given
the nature of the facts. In making physical proximity a legal element vis-a-vis a factual
consideration, the Wisconsin Supreme Court misinterpreted the holding and reasoning of
Palsgraf The court later admitted its misinterpretation and restated Waube as a case decided on
"judicial policy" rather than precedent. Klassa v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 77 N.W.2d 397,
401-02 (Wis. 1956), overruled by Bowen, 517 N.W.2d at 439.
63. Waube,258N.W. at 501.
64. Pearson, supra note 28, at 490.
65. At the time the Supreme Court adopted the zone of danger test for FELA claims,
fourteen jurisdictions followed the zone of danger test. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S.
532, 548 & n.9 (1994).
66. 441 P.2d 912. Dillon has produced a slew of academic commentary. Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 825 (Cal. 1989), notes that Dillon produced the following articles: Bell,
supra note 7; John L. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of
Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984);
Miller, supra note 37; Nolan & Ursin, supra note 7, at 620; Pearson, supra note 28; Richard N.
Pearson, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychic Harm: A Response to Professor Bell, 36 U.
FLA. L. REv. 413 (1984) [hereinafter Pearson, Response to Bell]; Rabin, supra note 37, at 1524-
26; John David Burley, Comment, Dillon Revisited: Toward a Better Paradigm for Bystander
Cases, 43 01O ST. L.J. 931, 948 (1982); Jeanne S. Gallagher, Note, Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals: California's New Tort of Negligent Infliction of Serious Emotional
Distress, 18 CAL. W. L. REV. 101 (1982); Claudia J. Wrazel, Note, Limiting Liability for the
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: The "Bystander Recovery" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L.
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street while her infant and daughter walked just ahead of her; the infant was
struck and killed by the defendant's car; the daughter was in close physical
proximity to the infant but the mother trailed several yards behind and
outside the zone of any physical threat.67 Before Dillon, California allowed
recovery only under the zone of danger test.6' Reasoning that she was in the
zone of danger, the lower court allowed recovery for the daughter but
denied the mother's claim because she was outside the zone of danger.69
The arbitrariness of the result was apparent-a few yards separated
recoverability between mother and daughter, though the mental injuries
were equally foreseeable and the defendant's culpability was the same.
Simply put, the application of the zone of danger test in this case defied
common sense.
Faced with these facts, California created the bystander rule.7" Reasoning
that mental injuries were foreseeable in the bystander context and
describing the facts as egregious, the court allowed recovery for the mother
though she had not been in physical danger.71 Without the bystander rule,
the difference between remedy and claim preclusion for the mother was a
few yards.72 Rather than accepting such an arbitrary division, the court
emphasized the foreseeability of the harm to the mother. It balanced the
humanitarian concerns and fashioned a three-prong test for bystander
liability: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the accident (spatial
proximity), (2) whether the mental injury resulted from "sensory and
contemporaneous observation of the accident" (temporal proximity), and (3)
whether the plaintiff and the physically injured victim were closely related
(relational proximity).7 3 Although limiting its holding to the three-prong
test, the Dillon court hinted that there was no good reason why the
traditional rules of negligence, including foreseeability, should not govern
all cases.74
REV. 847 (1981); Thomas C. Zaret, Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Reconciling the Bystander and Direct Victim Causes ofAction, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 145 (1983).
67. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914-15.
68. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963), overruled by
Dillon, 441 P.2d at 912.
69. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920.
70. Id. at 925.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 915.
73. Id. at 920.
74. Id. at 924. The court concluded with the observation: "Legal history shows that
artificial islands of exceptions, created from the fear that the legal process will not work, usually
do not withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into oblivion." Id. at 925.
Subsequently, about half the jurisdictions adopted the bystander test. See, e.g., Clohessy v.
Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 857 (Conn. 1996). These jurisdictions, however, differ on the
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Despite this suggestion, California subsequently restricted Dillon.
Twenty years later in 1988, the court in Elden v. Sheldon" limited Dillon
when it refused to extend the bystander rule beyond the "immediate family"
to unmarried cohabitants.76 The obvious problem is that strong emotional
bonds are not exclusive to the immediate family or marriage.77 The court
conceded, as it must, that some relationships outside of marriage can be just
as strong as familial ones.78 But it reasoned that the state has a strong
interest in promoting marriage and that the law needs to limit intolerable
burdens on defendants.79 The court was candid in its reasons:
Yet we cannot draw a principled distinction between an unmarried
cohabitant who claims to have a de facto marriage relationship
with his partner and de facto siblings, parents, grandparents or
children. The problems of multiplication of actions and damages
that would result from such an extension of liability would place
an intolerable burden on society.8°
As the court saw it, the choice was between principles and practicality, and
the court sacrificed the former.
A year later in Thing v. La Chusa,81 the court decided a case almost
identical in facts to Dillon, except that rather than contemporaneously
witnessing the accident, the mother arrived on the scene moments later and
saw her bloody, unconscious child on the road.82 The question in Dillon was
whether a few yards separated liability. The question in Thing was whether
a few minutes precluded recovery. The court refused to expand liability and
drew a bright line requirement that a bystander must have witnessed the
accident contemporaneously.83 Citing academic commentary, it reasoned
interpretation and elements of the Dillon three-prong test. See infra pp. 822-23 and
accompanying notes.
75. 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
76. Id. at 588.
77. See id. at 591 (Broussard, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority cling to the untenable notion
that only married couples can create families which promote society's interests."); Corso v.
Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 308 (N.H. 1979) (Grimes, J., dissenting) ("Love and affection is not
necessarily confined to parenthood or even blood relationship."). The marriage status per se is
not as reliable of an indicator of a strong emotional relationship as an active scrutiny of the
underlying facts. See generally Paul R. Amato, Good Enough Marriages: Parental Discord,
Divorce, and Children's Long-Term Well-Being, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 71 (2001)
(significant number of marriages end in divorce in American society).
78. Elden, 758 P.2d at 588.
79. Id. at 586, 588.
80. Id. at 588 (quoting Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
81. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
82. Id. at 815.
83. Id. at 830.
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that foreseeability alone was an inadequate barrier against a flood of
liability. 84 Here again it was concerned about the slippery slope to liability
oblivion as a few minutes becomes a few hours, contemporaneous presence
leads to arrival at the hospital, and so forth to the unlimited reach of logic
and imagination.85 These were practical considerations for which the court
had no principled answer. With this in mind, it followed the Elden lead,
tossing any pretensions of a principled approach and candidly admitting that
there "must be arbitrary lines to similarly limit the class of potential
plaintiffs. 86
Two years after Dillon, the Hawaii Supreme Court decided Rodrigues v.
State.87 The plaintiff there sued the state on the theory that it failed to
84. Id. at 826 (citing Diamond, supra note 66, at 480); Miller, supra note 37, at 39-41; see
Thing, 771 P.2d. at 830 ("[T]here are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever
and thus determine liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a socially and
judicially acceptable limit on recovery of damages for that injury.").
85. Thing, 771 P.2d. at 828; see also Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 136 (Cal. 1977)
(denying claim by father who witnessed childbirths that resulted in deaths of infants but did not
actually witness the deaths); Parsons v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 495, 498 (Ct. App. 1978)
(denying claim by parents who came upon the scene of the accident "before the dust had
settled"); Arauz v. Gerhardt, 137 Cal. Rptr. 619, 627 (Ct. App. 1977) (denying claim by mother
who arrived on the scene within five minutes of collision that caused her son's injury); Jansen v.
Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885 (Ct. App. 1973) (denying claim by mother
who witnessed child's painful death as a result of medical misdiagnosis); Deboe v. Horn, 94
Cal. Rptr. 77, 79 (Ct. App. 1971) (denied claim by wife who first witnessed her paralyzed
husband in hospital emergency room but did not witness accident). The arbitrary distinctions
left several judges questioning out loud where humanitarian concerns stop and liability's border
begins. See, e.g., Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 381 (N.J. 1994) (Garibaldi, J., dissenting):
Does anyone believe that a mother who is told that her child was killed
crossing the street, or that a mother who witnesses the prolonged agony of her
child dying as a result of a car accident that she did not see, suffers less
emotional distress than the mother who was present at the scene of the
accident?
Id.; Thing, 771 P.2d at 834 (Kaufman, J., concurring):
By what humane and principled standard might a court decide, as a matter of
law, that witnessing the bloody and chaotic aftermath of an accident involving
a loved one is compensable if viewed within 1 minute of impact but
noncompensable after 15? or 30? Is the shock of standing by while others
undertake frantic efforts to save the life of one's child any less real or
foreseeable when it occurs in an ambulance or emergency room rather than at
the "scene"?
Id.
86. Thing, 771 P.2d at 828. The concurrence noted that neither the majority nor the dissent
articulated principled rules, and that the majority "freely-one might say almost cheerfully-
acknowledges that its position is arbitrary." Id. at 831 (Kaufman, J., concurring). See Dunphy,
642 A.2d at 380 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) ("I perceive no sufficiently limiting principle in the
majority's standard for deciding who qualifies as an intimate family member.").
87. 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970).
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prevent flooding to his new home. The facts did not fit any of the common
law tests, including California's newly pronounced bystander test. Although
the court could have ruled that the mental injury was "parasitic" to
negligent damage to property,88 it instead recognized an interest in freedom
from negligent infliction of serious mental distress and created an
"independent legal protection" of such an interest.8 9 As in the case of
physical injuries, the court determined that general tort principles were
sufficient to limit liability to tolerable levels.90 Thus Rodrigues was the first
affirmative pronouncement of duty defined by reasonable foreseeability. 9'
Like California, Hawaii learned that foreseeability was too broad of a
concept. In Kelley v. Kokua Sales and Supply,92 plaintiff's decedent died of
a heart attack shortly after learning that his daughter and granddaughter
were killed in a traffic accident. 93 The decedent learned of this tragic news
while he was 2,500 miles away in California. Based on the earlier ruling in
Rodrigues, the court could have determined that the effect of the physical
distance on foreseeability was an issue for the factfinder. Instead, it held
that the duty of care announced in Rodrigues applies to plaintiffs who were
located within a reasonable distance from the scene of the accident.94 So in
Hawaii, physical distance became just another legal constraint against
liability, prompting one commentator to note amusingly that Hawaii
maintains a "same island" rule.95
The promise of Dillon and its progeny was a progression toward a
general theory of liability applying foreseeability as the measure of liability.
But the Dillon experiment has produced mixed results. Approximately half
the jurisdictions have adopted some form of a bystander rule,96 but each
jurisdiction has interpreted the three-prong test differently. Although the
California Supreme Court created the bystander test, various jurisdictions
have taken divergent approaches to bystander liability, putting their own
interpretations on the three-prong test (spatial, temporal, and relational
88. See supra p. 815 and note 47.
89. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520.
90. Id. at 520-21.
91. In Leong v. Takasaki, the Hawaii Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad principles of
Rodrigues. 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974). Similar to Dillon, the plaintiff was not in the zone of
danger and witnessed his step-grandmother killed. Id. at 763-66. The court ruled that the three
Dillon factors were not claim preclusive hurdles, but were instead factors that would be relevant
toward determining whether the injuries were genuine and severe. Id. at 765-66.
92. 532 P.2d 673 (Haw. 1975).
93. Id. at 674-75.
94. Id. at 676.
95. Crump, supra note 35, at 499-501; see Miller, supra note 37, at 11 ("If 2,500 miles is
unreasonable, will one, two, or ten miles be reasonable?").
96. This is as of 1994. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 549 & n.10 (1994).
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proximity elements). For example, rejecting Elden, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that "unmarried cohabitant[s] should be afforded the
[same] protections of bystander liability .... ,,9 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has taken a broad approach toward bystander liability by endorsing
"the traditional elements of a tort action in negligence-negligent conduct,
causation and injury (here severe emotional distress)-should serve as the
framework for evaluating a bystander's claim.""8 Iowa has placed limits on
the degree of familial relationship and requires relations "within the second
degree of consanguinity or affinity."99 In addition to the relational element,
various jurisdictions have interpreted the temporal proximity element
differently as well."
The bystander rule is not one rule, but really a loose guideline for
recovery that has been interpreted into rules with multiple flavors. The
California and Hawaii experiences were marked by a giant step forward in
the development of a general theory based on reasonable foreseeability,
followed by a significant retreat as courts feared a gradual slide into the
"fantastic realm of infinite liability."'10 1 Bright lines were drawn ad hoc as
the infinite possibilities of human happenstance presented themselves one
by one.'0 2 Arbitrary results were the practical end product of this
experiment, and the bystander rule became just one more compromised rule
available to courts to delimit liability. 03
C. Federal Common Law
Federal courts were no more consistent in dealing with the issue in the
context of creating federal common law under the Federal Employers'
97. Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994).
98. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 442-43 (Wis. 1994).
99. Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436(3) (1965) (requiring "peril to a member of his immediate family occurring in his
presence").
100. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (holding the plaintiff was
barred because she arrived at scene of an accident moments after); Bowen, 517 N.W.2d at 445
(drawing a distinction between contemporaneous perception and subsequent learning of an
accident). But see Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300, 307-08 (N.H. 1979) (involving a plaintiff
who arrived at scene of accident after hearing the thud of her daughter being hit by a car).
101. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 525 (Cal. 1963), overruled by
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 912 (Cal. 1968).
102. Nolan & Ursin, supra note 7, at 620; see Thing, 771 P.2d at 831 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring) (indicating post-Dillon case law marked by confusion and inconsistent results).
103. Cf Thing, 771 P.2d at 833-36 (Kaufman, J., concurring) (arguing Dillon should be
overruled as inherently arbitrary); Pearson, supra note 28, at 448 (arguing Dillon is no less
arbitrary than zone of danger test).
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Liability Act ("FELA").0 4 The statute gives railway workers the right to sue
for negligence, and the legislative intent was to eliminate traditional
defenses to tort liability and to facilitate recovery in meritorious cases.'0 5
Congress enacted FELA during -a period of early American industrial
expansion, and its policy was to shift to the industry the burden of the
"human overhead," a reference to the inevitable cost of "lost lives, limbs
and livelihoods" attributable to the railway enterprise, because workers
lacked the economic and bargaining power to negotiate for their safety.' °6
Although negligent infliction of emotional distress was recognized as a
cognizable theory under FELA,' °7 federal courts diverged greatly on the
applicable standard.'0 8
The test case for Supreme Court review was Gottshall v. Consolidated
Rail Corporation,°9 in which a railway employee suffered post-traumatic
stress syndrome after watching a close friend of 15 years die of a heart
attack while they were working in unbearable and dangerous weather
conditions."' The facts did not support a claim under the various common
law tests, including the physical impact, zone of danger, and bystander
104. FELA creates a cause of action for railway employees who have been killed or injured
"in whole or in part from the negligence" of the railway. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1986). The Jones
Act is FELA's counterpart for seamen. 46 U.S.C. §§ 688-92 (1975).
105. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 561 (1987).
106. Sinkler v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 329-30 (1958); Keman v. Am. Dredging
Co., 355 U.S. 426, 431-32 (1958); Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 366-67, 380
(3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 59 (1943)); see also
JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND
WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 129 (Farrar et al. eds., 1976) (noting that in 1924 the railway
industry killed 6617 persons and injured another 143,739 persons, most of whom were railway
employees).
107. The Supreme Court in Buell opened the door to negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims, but left the development to the lower courts, commenting only "that FELA
jurisprudence gleans guidance from common-law developments." 480 U.S. at 568.
108. After a thorough review of the case law in First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits, the Third Circuit found "no common discemable principle, test, view or
attitude." Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 365; see Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 169 (5th Cir.
1992) (allowing recovery for physical manifestation or impact, but not for bystander); Ray v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 938 F.2d 704, 705 (7th Cir. 1991) (adopting physical impact test); Elliott v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 910 F.2d 1224, 1229 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating unconscionable abuse or
outrageous conduct is threshold element of claim); Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536,
539-40 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); Stoklosa v. Consol. Rail Corp., 864 F.2d 425, 426 (6th Cir.
1988) (holding no negligence where injury is not foreseeable); Moody v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co.,
823 F.2d 693, 694 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating plaintiff failed to establish causation); Pierce v. So.
Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1372 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating, in dicta, "eggshell" plaintiff
rule applies when emotional injury causes physical manifestations of distress).
109. 988 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1993).
110. ld. at 358-61.
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tests."' There was no dispute that the plaintiffs mental injury was genuine
and severe, and that it was reasonably foreseeable." 2 The trial court held for
the defendant on summary judgment and the case was appealed to the Third
Circuit. The issue was whether these circumstances precluded as a matter of
law a claim under FELA.
The Third Circuit per Judge Nygaard held that the facts supported a
cause of action under FELA. It began its analysis by refusing to designate a
particular common law test as the definitive test for a FELA claim." 3
Reasoning that FELA was a broad remedial statute specifically enacted to
expand rights beyond the common law," 4 the court discounted the common
law tests as arbitrary and questionable methods for assuring the genuineness
of injury." 5 Explicitly rejecting legal formalism, the court fashioned a rule
that required an initial judicial review for a threshold assurance of an indicia
"of genuine and serious mental injury."'' 6 This review looked to the
common law for guiding principles, but required less mechanical adherence
to rules of law and more "active scrutiny of the facts.""' 7
The Third Circuit then reviewed the claim under the Dillon bystander
test, but noted that it would be a rare situation in which one railway worker
would see a family member injured or killed." 8 The practical application of
11. Id. at 371-74. The Supreme Court eventually remanded the case to consider the matter
under the zone of danger test. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557-58 (1994).
Subsequently, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff did not suffer a physical impact and the
working conditions were not sufficiently dangerous to constitute a zone of danger. Gottshall v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 56 F.3d 530, 532 (3d Cir. 1995).
112. See infra note 125. The plaintiff also exhibited a number of physical manifestations,
including lost weight, hospitalization, medical diagnosis of major depression and post-traumatic
stress disorder, insomnia, physical weakness, cold sweats, and nausea. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at
374.
113. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 365, 369.
114. Id. at 367-70. The primary purpose of FELA was to expand the remedies available
under common law by eliminating a number of traditional defenses to tort liability and to
facilitate recovery in meritorious cases. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S.
557, 561 (1987); see 45 U.S.C. § 53 (allowing contributory negligence to reduce recovery); id.
§ 54 (imposing limitation on assumption of risk defenses); id. § 55 (prohibiting contracting to
limit FELA liability); id. § 60 (imposing limitations on employee at-will doctrine to preclude
retaliatory discharge); Kernan v. Am. Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 424, 438-39 (1958) (holding that,
unlike the common law, negligence per se under 45 U.S.C. § 51 results from violation of any
statutory duty regardless of whether statute was intended to protect against specific harm);
Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (relaxing causation element to
causation in fact "even the slightest").
115. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 370.
116. Id. at371.
117. Id. (quoting Outten v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 928 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1991))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. at 372.
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the relational proximity element would nullify the rule in the FELA
context." 9 The court discarded the relational element as an arbitrary point
on a continuum of relationships, and reasoned that the plaintiff was a
foreseeable bystander and the closeness of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the decedent was a matter for the factfinder. It held that the
claim had a sufficient indicia of genuineness based on the facts and
common law principles, and then evaluated the claim in light of the
traditional tort concepts of breach of duty, causation, and injury. 120
Thus the court pronounced a general theory of liability for negligent
infliction of emotional distress: a claim should be judicially reviewed for a
"sufficient indicia of genuineness," a determination that "gleans guidance
from common-law [principles],' 12' and upon meeting this burden it is then
analyzed by the court and factfinder under traditional tort principles. 22 In
announcing this legal framework, the court made clear that its decision was
driven by the legislative intent of FELA, in which Congress, rather than the
courts, allocated the economic and social costs, and that the threat of
exponential liability to the general populace was not at issue since FELA is
limited to the railway industry. 13
The Supreme Court per Justice Thomas reversed, opining that the Third
Circuit's ruling was "fatally flawed.' ' 124 As a preliminary matter, the
Supreme Court conceded that the injury was genuine and severe, and also
reasonably foreseeable.'25 These facts were not enough, however. Unlike the
119. Id.
120. Id. at 374.
121. See supra note 107. This step in the analysis is best seen as a hybrid factual and legal
determination where the courts would act as a gatekeeper against claims most likely to be
fraudulent, frivolous, or freakish in nature.
122. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 380. With the caveat that mental injuries must withstand an
initial judicial scrutiny, the Third Circuit treated mental injuries no differently than physical
ones. Id. ("When a claim for emotional injuries shows a sufficient indicia of genuineness so as
to create a factual dispute, the same tort principles apply to the employer's liability."). A year
after Gottshall was announced, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted a very similar, two-tiered
approach under which the traditional elements of a negligence action are conditioned on a
judicial certification of validity based on public policy considerations. Bowen v. Lumbermens
Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 442-43 (Wis. 1994).
123. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 372. Invoking Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E.
99 (N.Y. 1928), Judge Roth dissented and argued the plaintiff was not a foreseeable victim. Id.
at 383-85 (Roth, J., dissenting).
124. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 551 (1994). Justice Thomas delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Souter joined. Id. at 534. Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion. Id. Justice
Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined. Id.
125. Id. at 568-69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Gottshall's injuries sufficiently satisfied the
physical manifestation test. See supra note 112. Moreover, the Supreme Court conceded that the
emotional injury was reasonably foreseeable to Conrail, but noted "that qualifier seems to add
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Third Circuit's fact specific approach, the Supreme Court endorsed a bright
line, rule-based decision. It canvassed the common law and counted
fourteen jurisdictions using the zone of danger test and nearly half the states
using the more liberal bystander rule. 126 It then adopted the more restrictive
zone of danger test as the exclusive rule for FELA claims. 127 Although
acknowledging that "the zone of danger test is arbitrary," it found the
common law's policy considerations to be compelling, "particularly the fear
of unlimited liability.,
128
The dissent per Justice Ginsburg observed that the injury was real and
severe, and satisfied the common law's physical manifestation test. 19 It
noted that FELA was enacted as a remedial statute whose purpose was to
provide remedy where the common law would not have. The inconsistency
in the majority approach was apparent-it touted the virtues of the common
law and FELA's liberal remedial policies but nevertheless selected a more
restrictive, minority rule.13° Moreover, the dissent noted that the majority's
reference to a singular "common law" was misplaced, and that the common
law was decidedly conflicted in this field. 3' Noting that the fear of limitless
liability is unwarranted since FELA is limited to railway workers and that
little" and that "nearly any injury could also be reasonably foreseeable." Gottshall, 512 U.S. at
533 n.12. This comment simply echoes the same observation made by other courts and
commentators that foreseeability is a useless device in these cases.
126. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 548 & n.9, 549 & n.10.
127. Id. at 556. The opinion appeared also to have adopted the physical impact test:
recovery is allowed for "those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a
defendant's negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that
conduct." Id. at 547-48 (emphasis added). But subsequently in Metro-North Commuter
Railroad Co. v. Buckley, the Supreme Court clarified that physical impact does not mean any
physical contact, but contact of the type that causes physical trauma for which mental injuries
are then said to be a parasitic claim. 521 U.S. 424, 432-37 (1997).
128. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court
identified its primary concern as "unpredictable and nearly infinite liability." Id. at 552.
129. Id. at 568-69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12,
§ 54, at 364). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in Justice Ginsburg's dissent. Id at 559.
130. Id. at 569 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Neither the majority nor the dissent explained
why the majority was forced to select the more restrictive zone of danger test. The reason is
grounded in practical application. As Judge Nygaard noted, "the reality in the railway industry
is that there will hardly be a situation where one sees another family member injured while
working in the railroad yard." Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 372 (3d Cir. 1993).
Strictly applied, the bystander rule would be a nullity. Unable to devise an alternative proposal,
the majority had no choice but to choose the zone of danger test though this test is antiquated
and undermines FELA's remedial purpose.
131. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Congress intended to provide broad remedies, 13 2 the dissent endorsed the
Third Circuit's approach.'33
The Gottshall decisions stand as a perfect microcosm of the longstanding
judicial struggle to fashion operative rules of law that balance the
competing policies.'34 The two decisions and the various opinions expressed
therein represent the competing theories of the ongoing debate. Weighing
the humanitarian considerations, the Third Circuit recognized a general
theory of liability for mental injury claims in the limited context of FELA
claims.'35 Fearing the potential for unlimited liability even under liberal
FELA jurisprudence, the Supreme Court adopted a test that was first
devised around the turn of the twentieth century and currently rejected by
most common law jurisdictions. 3 6 The Third Circuit and the Supreme Court
weighed the policies differently, and the judicial methodologies for
analyzing these claims reflect their choices. The Third Circuit endorsed a
132. See id. at 571-72 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns over unlimited
liability). But see Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 373 (holding an expansion of FELA rights will not
place an intolerable burden upon society because the cause of action is limited to railway cases).
133. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 571 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the Third Circuit's
method was a "thoughtfully developed and comprehensively explained approach"). The
Supreme Court's decision in Gottshall signaled a puzzling contraction of FELA rights for
mental injuries. Although FELA was enacted to expand the right to recover beyond the common
law, see Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 562 (1987), the Supreme
Court contracted FELA liability so that railway workers now have less rights than the general
populace with respect to mental injury claims, an anomaly the majority neglected to address. As
the Supreme Court admits, the zone of danger test is a more restrictive, minority test under the
common law. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555-57. Subsequently, FELA rights continued to be
contracted. In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, a worker brought suit for a
three-year exposure to asbestos, which increased his risk of death to cancer by one percent to
five percent. 521 U.S. 424 (1997). The Supreme Court rejected the argument that asbestos dust
was a "physical impact" on the plaintiff. Id. at 430-31. Under the common law, such an
exposure to dust particles would have been recognized as a "physical impact" event and so
recoverable under this most restrictive test. See supra pp. 816-17 and accompanying notes.
134. For a general discussion of the Gottshall decisions, see Thomas C. Galligan & Jean
Paul Picou Overton, Developments in the Law 1993-1994: A Faculty Symposium, Recent
United States Supreme Court Developments in Admiralty, 55 LA. L. REv. 469, 480-89 (1995)
(discussing the Third Circuit and Supreme Court opinions); William T. Krizner, Is There a
Better Standard than the Zone of Danger Test for Negligent Emotional Distress Claims Under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act?, 34 ToRT & INS. L.J. 907 (1999); Thomas Phillip
Germeroth, Note, Trapped in the Zone: Emotional Distress Claims Under the Federal
Employers Liability Act After Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 40 ST. LouIs U. L.J.
203 (1996).
135. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 380-81; see Ries v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 960 F.2d 1156,
1167 (3d Cir. 1992) (Nygaard, J., concurring) ("The development of FELA, like common law
principles, should proceed on a case by case, statute by statute basis to reflect changing
conditions and values."); Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Wis.
1994) ("People should not, courts reasoned, be able to sue for everyday minor disturbances.").
136. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 549, 557.
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case-by-case fact based approach: "[t]he solution is not found in rules of
law so much as in an active scrutiny of the facts." '137 The Supreme Court
emphasized the primacy of a bright line rule: "[rules] place limits on this
potential liability by restricting the class of plaintiffs who may recover and
the types of harm for which plaintiffs may recover."'3 In the end,
uniformity was achieved only through finality.
A review of the common law and federal cases shows five points of
agreement in this field. (1) Trivial, frivolous, or evanescent injuries should
not be cognizable.'39 (2) Foreseeability as a practical consideration is an
inadequate tool for mental injury claims. 4 ' (3) The fear of a slippery slope
to unlimited liability is the most problematic policy consideration.'41 (4) The
common law tests are arbitrary, a matter "freely--one might say almost
cheerfully" admitted by courts themselves. 42 (5) Courts have failed to find a
more principled general theory of liability that practically limits liability to
predictable levels. 43 This article, too, accepts these conclusions, but these
points of agreement lead us back to the start of the inquiry. The question
remains: How should the law treat the universe of foreseeable, genuinely
injured plaintiffs?
There are no discernable trends or commonly accepted theories in this
field,'" or in less generous terms the "trouble stems in part from the
137. Gottshall, 988 F.2d at 371.
138. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 552. Subsequently, in clarifying its decision in Gottshall, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the common law's approach was designed to deny courts the
authority to undertake a case-by-case examination. Buckley, 520 U.S. at 436.
139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965) ("Complete emotional
tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional
distress is a part of the price of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress
inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.").
140. See, e.g., Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 553, 556-67; Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 818
(Cal. 1989); Pearson, supra note 28, at 515; Rabin, supra note 37, at 1523-26. But see infra
note 144 (noting that a few commentators, most notably Bell, have suggested that foreseeability
should be the appropriate test). Of course, there is no duty toward unforeseeable plaintiffs.
141. See, e.g., Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 552 ("A more significant problem is the prospect that
allowing such suits can lead to unpredictable and nearly infinite liability for defendants.");
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 825 (Cal. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting) ("The
fundamental problem is not foreseeing (by unguided hindsight) the consequences of
unintentional conduct, but rather realistically limiting liability for those consequences.").
142. Thing, 771 P.2d at 831 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
143. Molien, 616 P.2d at 817-19. Many jurisdictions have wandered the judicial wilderness
in search of a principled theory of liability. See, e.g., Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517
N.W.2d 432, 436-42 (Wis. 1994) (describing a sixty-year progression of different rules).
144. A review of the academic literature shows that commentators have been equally
divergent in their views. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 7, at 347-51 (proposing that mental injuries
should be treated no differently than physical injuries and that they should be evaluated under
general tort principles of duty, causation, and damage); Crump, supra note 35, at 494-505
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impoverished conceptual framework employed by most scholars and many
courts to analyze negligence claims.' ' 145 The judicial methods have been
practical to the exclusion of principles, and the scale has been decidedly
weighted in favor of the policy consideration of limited liability. The
common law rules are really exceptions to the general rule against recovery
for mental injuries. One need only etch the surface of these rules to
understand that at their core were distinctions based on neither legal
principles nor factual truths: mental injuries do not always exhibit physical
symptoms, they are not limited to such close call situations envisioned in
the physical impact or zone of danger tests, there is no reason to believe that
only close family members would be hurt by witnessing another physically
(proposing strict limitations on claim based on contractual relationships, independent torts, and
limited bystander cases); Julie A. Greenberg, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A
Proposal for a Consistent Theory of Tort Recovery for Bystanders and Direct Victims, 19 PEPP.
L. REV. 1283, 1310 (1992) (refining the Dillon test to take into consideration preexisting
relationships in law or fact and proposing specific guidelines to define direct victims); Elizabeth
Handsley, Mental Injury Occasioned by Harm to Another: A Feminist Critique, 14 LAW &
INEQ. 391, 486-87 (1996) (criticizing law as discriminatory against women and suggesting
general application of tort law); Deborah K. Hepler, Providing Creative Remedies to Bystander
Emotional Distress Victims: A Feminist Perspective, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 71, 78 (1993)
(advocating a focus on relationships in bystander situations); Miller, supra note 37, at 47
(proposing an expansion of the class of plaintiffs to all foreseeable plaintiffs, but limiting
damages to economic out-of-pocket loss); Pearson, supra note 28, at 478 (endorsing the zone of
danger test as the proper standard); J. Mark Appleberry, Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional
Distress: A Focus on Relationships, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 301 (1995) (proposing refinements to
the currently existing rules based on a focus on the underlying relationships, but not a broad
overhaul of the current rules); Paul V. Calandrella, Note, Safe Haven for a Troubled Tort: A
Return to the Zone of Danger for the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 26 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 79, 104 (1992) (endorsing the zone of danger test); Donovan, supra note 47, at 1395-96
(proposing that foreseeability is sufficient to distinguish genuine injuries, and that the physical
injury requirement be abolished); Ethan Finneran, Note, The Death of the Ensuing Physical
Injury Rule: Validating Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Harm, 10 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 213, 237 (1981) (approving generally the Dillon rule as the appropriate limitation);
Eugene Kontorovich, Comment, The Mitigation of Emotional Distress Damages, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 491, 491-92 (2001) (advocating significant restriction on mental injury claims on the basis
that such claims present problems of moral hazard and mitigation of damages); Thomas J. Lo,
Note, Thing v. La Chusa-Public Policy Demands a Limitation on the Bystander Recovery for
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 17 W. ST. U. L. REV. 499, 500 (1990) (proposing limits on
bystander liability); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an
Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1262-63 (1971) [hereinafter Comment, Mental Distress]
(proposing a generally applicable tort scheme in which foreseeability is the measure of duty);
Michael Phillips, Note, Drawing the Line: Missouri Adopts the Zone of Danger Rule for
Bystander Emotional Distress: Asaro v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital, 56 Mo. L. REV.
1183, 1199 (1991) (proposing reasonable foreseeability as the test for liability); S. Claire Swift,
Note, Bystander Liability After Dunphy v. Gregor: A Proposal for a New Definition of the
Bystander, 15 REv. LITIG. 579, 600 (1996) (proposing that the bystander test properly defines
the limit of how far the common law should go toward creating liability for mental injuries).
145. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 1667.
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injured or killed, nor is mental injury any more genuine and defendant's
conduct any more culpable when the accident is witnessed
contemporaneously rather than subsequently communicated. On the other
hand, the nature of mental injuries poses significant problems of
verification, unpredictability, and limitless potential for which the law must
somehow balance.
III. PROBLEMS POSED BY MENTAL INJURIES
A. Floodgates of Fraud and Frivolity
In evaluating theories of recovery, we must acknowledge that mental
injuries are different in important ways.'46 Because they are difficult to
verify empirically, courts have been naturally wary of fraudulent or
frivolous claims. This is a legitimate consideration as is the broader concern
that fraudulent claims present a systemic problem to the legal system. In
this regard, however, courts have failed to distinguish the purely evidentiary
question of the seriousness of an injury from the legal question of whether a
duty exists at all.'47 The factfinding process should distinguish severe
mental injury from transient, ordinary harm for which the law should not
provide remedy.148 Compensable mental injury is not ordinary and should
be proved by appropriate evidentiary methods, whether they be expert
testimony, palpable physical symptoms, hospitalization or therapy, parade
of fact witnesses independently attesting to the injury, etc., or any
combination of these means. It should be the odd trial, if conducted
properly by the deliberative bodies, that a plaintiffs bald testimony-"I
suffered severe mental injury," supported by a self-serving tear or two-
suffices to carry the day.'49
146. There are some commentators who would appear to disagree with this proposition.
See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136, 171, 189 (1992)
(suggesting that the dichotomy between physical and mental injuries is meaningless); Sandor &
Berry, supra note 10, at 1261 (same). But at the heart of their positions is the notion that from a
normative perspective mental injuries are no less deserving of remedies, with which I have no
quarrels. That mental injuries differ from physical ones in behavioral and etiological
characteristics is self-evident.
147. Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1249.
148. See supra note 7.
149. See Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 447 (Wis. 1994) (Wilcox,
J., concurring) (stating that more than uncorroborated claims of emotional injury is necessary to
survive a motion to dismiss); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 54, at 361 ("It is
entirely possible to allow recovery only upon satisfactory evidence and deny it when there is
nothing to corroborate the claim, or to look for some guarantee of genuineness in the
36:0805]
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Genuineness of injury is a question of fact and not an issue of law. 5 '
Judges and juries can adequately distinguish the fraud from the genuine. 5
And courts have become more comfortable with the nature of mental
injuries as the psychiatric and psychological fields have progressed. 5 2 "The
problem from this perspective is one of adequate proof."'53 Fraud, frivolity,
and unethical conduct by lawyers and clients are not unique to claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. They are an unfortunate fact of
law practice. There is no reason to believe, however, that claims for mental
circumstances of the case."). Mental injuries are often marked by physical symptoms, and a
strong correlation exists between manifestations of anxiety and physical illness. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. c (noting that transitory, nonrecurring physical
phenomena such as dizziness and vomiting are not severe mental injuries); Levit, supra note
146, at 184-88 and accompanying notes (citing various studies to support the proposition that
psychological distress and physical illness are connected). The Gottshall decision was so
difficult because the mental injury was clearly severe for which the law provided no relief
despite the injury being foreseeable. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 538 (1994);
Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 375 (3d Cir. 1993).
150. See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (stating that
determination of a serious and compensable injury should not turn on arbitrary classifications
but is a matter of proof to be presented to the trier of fact).
151. The weight and credibility of the evidence is the exclusive province of the factfinder.
See, e.g., Ferrara v. Galluchio, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252-53 (N.Y. 1958); see also Elden v. Sheldon,
758 P.2d 582, 592-93 (Cal. 1988) (quoting Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669,
681 (Cal. 1974)) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (noting that courts and juries can make sensitive
factual determinations; difficulty of measuring loss is insufficient justification to deny
compensation); Bowen, 517 N.W.2d at 443 ("Detection of false claims is best left to the
adversary process."); Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1255 (pointing out that matters of proof
are for juries and "inappropriate screening of claims by -the court at the pleading phase is a
usurpation of the jury's function").
152. See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20 (Haw. 1970) (noting that courts
and juries may rely on "sophistication of the medical profession and the ability of the court and
jury to weed out dishonest claims"); Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 678-79 (Pa. 1979) (finding
that medical science can establish a causal link between mental injury and defendant's conduct);
Bowen, 517 N.W.2d at 443 (stating that "emotional distress can be established by [medical
science rather] than proof [through] physical manifestation."); see also PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 12, § 54, at 361 (finding mental injuries often marked by definite physical
symptoms, which are capable of medical or other objective proof); Bell, supra note 7, at 351
(noting that the mental health profession has increased in sophistication since advent of physical
impact and zone of danger tests); Marlowe, supra note 3, at 789 (finding mental distress is no
longer viewed as so substantially different from physical injury because of advances in medical
and behavioral sciences); Comment, Mental Distress, supra note 144, at 1248-53 (finding
claims for mental injuries can be objectively ascertained by expert medical testimony).
153. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 54, at 361; see, e.g., Molien, 616 P.2d at 818,
820 (finding the essential question is one of proof, whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious
and compensable injury; it is entirely possible to allow recovery upon satisfactory evidence of
some guarantee of genuineness); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 918 (Cal. 1968) (noting that
potential jury error is inherent in the judicial process but is no reason for substituting case-by-
case factfinding with artificial and indefensible barrier).
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injuries are a quantum more susceptible to fraud or abuse than other causes
of action within and outside of tort law.'54 For example, the vast majority of
insurance fraud consists of claims for property damage, physical injury, and
economic loss;'55 and pain and suffering for whiplash or other soft tissue
injuries are no more difficult to fake or exaggerate than a purely mental
injury,'i 6 but these claims have been widely accepted for many years.57
Moreover, courthouses today are full of marginal lawsuits, whether filed for
settlement value, harassment purpose, or other improper motive. Courts
have learned to deal with these claims through various means. Procedurally,
there are sanctions and rules of attorney supervision 58 Institutionally, the
road to trial is long and expensive, testing the resolve of plaintiffs. 5 9 But
perhaps the most effective tool available is the broad range of discretion
inherent in the court's power to shape and contour the litigation as it moves
from pleading to trial. Courts have become increasingly adverse to litigation
154. See Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1254 ("Accordingly, treating emotional distress
as singularly difficult seems disingenuous."). Historically, courts have allowed recovery for
pain and suffering for physical ones, mental injuries for intentional torts, and mental injuries in
the context of restrictive common law tests. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 918-19. These well established
causes of action were equally susceptible to fraudulent claims. Id.
155. See Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remedies, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 907, 924-33 (1992); Louis J. Papa & Anthony Basile, No-Fault Insurance
Fraud: An Overview, 17 TOURO L. REv. 611, 611-15 (2001).
156. Bell, supra note 7, at 352.
157. PROSSER& KEETON, supra note 12, § 54, at 362-63; see, e.g., Fry v. Dubuque & S.W.
Ry. Co., 45 Iowa 416 (1877) (allowing recovery for actual suffering of mind and body when
they are the "immediate and necessary consequences" of negligence); Keyes v. Minneapolis &
St. Louis Ry. Co., 30 N.W. 888, 889-90 (Minn. 1886) (same); Hargis v. Knoxville Power Co.,
94 S.E. 702, 703 (N.C. 1917) (same); Pa. R.R. Co. v. Allen, 53 Pa. 276, 278-79 (1867) (same);
see also Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544 (1994) (distinguishing mental
injuries from pain and suffering associated with physical injuries) (quoting Pearson, supra note
28, at 485 n.45). One commentator has noted that pain and suffering denotes actual pain caused
by physical injury, whereas mental injuries are a higher order cognitive reaction to a highly
disturbing event. Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents:
Pain-and-Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1785, 1789 n.11 (1995).
158. Rules of procedure anticipate that litigants may act frivolously or fraudulently. Federal
and state procedural rules provide remedies against such behavior. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11,
37 (providing sanctions for frivolous pleadings and discovery abuses). Many state rules of
procedure mirror the Federal Rules. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. Cry. P. 11, 37. In addition, each state
provides ethical rules and sanctions for fraudulent behavior by attorneys. See, e.g., ARIZ. R.
SuP. CT. 42, Rules of Professional Conduct, ER 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law.").
159. Outside of small claims, civil trials take several years from the filing of the complaint
to trial in many jurisdictions. During this time, plaintiffs are subject to various dispositive
motions. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 56.
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in general, and the frivolous suit swims in hostile waters.1 60 Such actions are
subject to dismissal, bias, indifference, and downright hostility. Courts have
historically been diligent in ferreting out fraudulent and frivolous claims as
evinced by the cautious, if not disjointed, development of the law in this
field,'61 and one suspects they will continue to keep the vigil.
In practice, fraudulent claims are easy to plead but difficult to prove. 62
Attorneys are not quick to take on fraudulent claims, if for no other reason
than because such claims have a low probability of success. The road from
filing a complaint to proof at trial is pitted with the perils of diligent
opposing counsel, judge's acumen, collective common sense of the jury,
attorney sanctions, and disciplinary measures. Absent compelling or at least
credible facts, it is difficult to present a claim for genuine and severe mental
injury without evidence of physical manifestations, treatment by mental
health professionals, or other facts augmenting a plaintiffs bare testimony
that he suffered.
Further supporting the point is the nature of attorney-client relationships.
Lawsuits are costly endeavors. Notwithstanding the ethical ideal, contingent
fee arrangements prevalent in personal injury cases are really business
partnerships.' 63 The plaintiff provides the business opportunity, and the
attorney provides not only the intellectual capital and labor, but also the
financial capital in the form of attorney's fees and costs including expert
witness fees. Both partners must agree on the venture. Trials for personal
injury are often expensive endeavors for fee-risking attorneys. The potential
payoff from a claim involving compelling facts may give an attorney the
incentive to bring a frivolous or borderline claim for mental injuries, but
160. In 2002, out of 258,876 cases filed in the U.S. District Courts, only 4569 went to trial
(constituting 1.8% of cases filed). Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 462-
63 (2004). In 1962, the comparative figures were 50,320 and 5802 (11.5%). Id. The decrease in
number and percentage of trials shows a "striking philosophical, ideologically driven view that
is hostile to trials." Adam Liptak, U.S. Suits Multiply, but Fewer Ever Get to Trial, Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al (quoting Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit).
161. See supra Part II, pp. 813-31 and accompanying notes.
162. Bell, supra note 7, at 351 (feigning a psychic injury successfully is no easy matter);
Levit, supra note 146, at 139, 167-74 (same); Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1254 & n.33
(same) (citing Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 678-79 (Pa. 1979)); Comment, Mental Distress,
supra note 144, at 1258-62.
163. Bell, supra note 7, at 388. Most lawyers are entrepreneurs, and conduct their business
with an eye toward economic self-interest. Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players:
Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of Professional Discipline, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
293, 295-96 (1984). Although the ethical rules prohibit such self-interest to affect the course of
a case, lawyers routinely depart from this ideal standard in their dealings with clients. Id. at
296-97.
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most attorneys would avoid a pure claim for mental injuries absent
significant physical injuries (or perhaps even property damage) in which
case the mental injury claim can become a "parasitic" claim, or absent some
other salient facts that make a compelling case for the genuineness of the
claim. If the facts are compelling enough, self selection would suggest that
such claims generally have a higher probability of merit. If they are not, an
attorney would be cautious in accepting a case based purely on a plaintiffs
averment of severe mental injury. '64Accordingly, many attorneys would be
reluctant to bring a frivolous claim for mental injury, including the ethically
challenged but fiscally sound attorneys.
This does not mean that frivolous or fraudulent claims do not have
settlement value. There is no question that such claims are brought, and it
can be argued that if the rule of law is relaxed, more frivolous or fraudulent
claims would coalesce around the outer edges of the rule. 165 In this regard,
mental injury claims are no different from any other claims brought for
abusive reasons or nuisance value, or claims supported by perjury or other
misleading evidence. Frivolous, fraudulent, and abusive claims are brought
everyday across the wide spectrum of law for settlement value or other
inappropriate reasons. Trivial mental injury claims are not extraordinary in
this regard. They are simply a fact of everyday law practice, and there is no
reason to discriminate against mental injury claims just because they share
the same problems inherent in the legal system.
The concern for fraudulent and frivolous claims is legitimate. But the
judicial system is capable of dealing with the problem, and it does no justice
to deny remedies to the vast majority just because some claims may be
false. 166 In Gottshall, the Supreme Court opined that the concern underlying
the common law tests "has nothing to do with the potential for fraudulent
claims."'' 67 Perhaps Justice Thomas overstated the matter in his attempt to
justify the appropriateness of the admittedly arbitrary zone of danger test, 68
164. See Bell, supra note 7, at 388 (noting that due to the contingent fee structure of
attorney-client relationships, damages of $400-$500 are simply not worth pursuing).
165. See Pearson, Response to Bell, supra note 66, at 428 (noting that small claims may
have settlement value even if it would not be worth a trial).
166. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 54, at 361; see Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912,
918 (Cal. 1968) (noting the possibility that some fraud will escape detection does not justify
abdication of judicial responsibility to award damages for sound claims); Chiuchiolo v. New
Eng. Wholesale Tailors, 150 A. 540, 543 (N.H. 1930) (noting that if it is conceded that judicial
system for ascertaining truth is inadequate to defeat fraudulent claims, result is
acknowledgement that courts are unable to render justice).
167. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottsall, 512 U.S. 532, 552 (1994).
168. See supra p. 827 and accompanying notes; see also Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Wis. 1994) ("Courts have historically been apprehensive that
psychological injuries would be easy to feign and that suits would be brought for trivial
835
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
but he correctly observed that the "more significant problem is the prospect
that allowing such suits can lead to unpredictable and nearly infinite
liability for defendants.' ' 169 Fraud and frivolity are matters of evidence,
procedure, ethics, and attorney supervision, and the current rules and
institutional influences, while imperfect, should provide the appropriate
framework for dealing with the issue. Wholesale legal preclusion based
purely on this policy consideration is unwarranted and an overreaction to
the problem. The most problematic policy consideration is the fear of
potentially infinite and unpredictable liability. 7 °
B. Limits of Infinite Foreseeability
Some commentators have suggested that the common law's varying tests
be abolished in favor of applying the traditional negligence test for duty. 7'
The premise is that we should have an entitlement to mental tranquility just
as we are entitled to be free of wrongfully inflicted physical injuries.'72 This
purity of principle is tempting, but ultimately facile. Experience has shown
that the general theory of negligence is too impractical.'73 Although some
courts have flirted with the concept of foreseeability, they have either
retreated from this position or were overruled.'74 As one court observed
emotional distress more dependent on the peculiar emotional sensitivities of the plaintiff than
upon the nature of the tortfeasor's conduct.").
169. Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. 532, 552 (1994); see Elden v. Sheldon, 758
P.2d 582, 587 (Cal. 1988) (stressing the need for a "sufficiently definite and predictable test to
allow for consistent application from case to case").
170. See Rabin, supra note 37, at 1526, 1537. The concern over disproportionate liability is
the most lasting policy limitation. Marlowe, supra note 3, at 790; see, e.g., Gottshall, 512 U.S.
at 554-57 (expressing concern over infinite liability); Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 826-27
(Cal. 1989) (same); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (Haw. 1975) (same);
Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1286 (N.J. 1993) (same).
171. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 7, at 335; Nolan & Ursin, supra note 7, at 620-21.
172. Bell, supra note 7, at 341.
173. Goldberg and Zipursky best summarized the development of the law and its current
state of uneasy resignation:
Thus, it is not surprising that what we see by the end of the twentieth century
is not a realization of the fault principle in the area of emotional distress, but
the realization that the courts are obligated out of practical considerations to
restrict its operation, even though the courts cannot justify all or even most of
the lines that they are drawing.
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 1671.
174. See, e.g., Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 374-83 (3d Cir. 1993); Dillon
v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520-21 (Haw.
1970). Because foreseeability is a slippery slope toward infinite liability, some commentators
have suggested that liability be extended to all foreseeable plaintiffs, but such recovery should
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succinctly, "foreseeability is useless in fixing duty.', 175 After one hundred
years of experiment and debate, the collective intelligence of the legal
marketplace has rejected foreseeability as too broad a concept,
disproportionately assigning liability to defendants under the shibboleth that
mental injuries are no different from physical ones and that traditional rules
are adequate to deal with the problem.
The fear of pure foreseeability is not only legitimate, but compelling. In
any negligence claim, the extent of a defendant's liability depends on two
variables: the extent of liability running to each victim, which I term
severity, and the number of injured victims, which I term scope of exposure.
Accordingly, a defendant's liability can be reduced to a simple formula. If
we denote L for a defendant's total liability, S for severity, and the sum
term (1 + . . . + N) for scope of exposure, a defendant's total liability is
represented in the following notation:
N
L = Si , i.e., the sum term, L = (Si +.. +SN).
This notation clearly shows the problem. Severity and scope of exposure
are largely uncontrollable and unpredictable factors, and therefore so too is
aggregate liability. Any given negligent act could produce only a stiff neck
in a car accident or 250 deaths in a plane crash. The scope of exposure and
severity are matters of chance, and courts will not weigh the culpability
against the resulting aggregate liability. 176 The eggshell plaintiff doctrine
reflects this attitude: We take plaintiffs as we find them. 77 Although
severity could be grossly disproportionate to the defendant's conduct in
some relativistic sense of moral justice, courts have historically imposed the
full liability upon a finding of negligence. Any other rule would make the
administration of justice difficult as courts must extrapolate foreseeable
be restricted to economic losses and loss of consortium. See Diamond, supra note 66, at 479-80,
504; Miller, supra note 37, at 36-43, 47.
175. Bro v. Glaser, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 919 (Ct. App. 1994). The court continued: "The
obvious predicate for these pronouncements is that emotional distress is always foreseeable.
Thus, if the risk is foreseeable in every instance, some other criterion for establishing duty must
be relied upon." Id.
176. Even if a catastrophic accident results in enormous losses, no one would argue that
the level of losses in and of itself would require a court-imposed limitation of liabilities. Rabin,
supra note 37, at 1529 & n.52; see also Magruder, supra note 58, at 1044 ("The ultimate
stopping point of liability in this class of cases cannot yet be stated.").
177. The eggshell plaintiff rule applies to plaintiffs with preexisting medical or physical
conditions. See, e.g., Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 576 (5th Cir. 1991); Bertolone v. Jeckovich,
481 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (App. Div. 1984); Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 43, at
292.
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damage vis-a-vis damage attributable to the preexisting condition resulting
from the defendant's culpability, and do so in a quantifiably (and
epistemologically) justified manner. 7 ' Ordinarily, most bright line
modifications of recoverable damages are imposed through the legislative
process as statutory damages, caps or ceilings, or multipliers on damages,
which find legitimacy in the representative process and collective will of
democracy to impose such value judgments.'79
The problem has been the aggregate scope of exposure, the sum Y (1
+ . . . + N). Because N can be a large number of foreseeable plaintiffs,
liability is said to be infinite, particularly when severity cannot be
controlled or predicted as well. 8 The common law solution to this problem
has been to restrict a defendant's duty to a specific subset of foreseeable
plaintiffs, and thereby restrict the scope of exposure. This solution is
eminently practical, but thoroughly unprincipled. Although restrictive in its
approach, the common law is correct to fear unlimited liability for all
classes of foreseeable plaintiffs. In any given event, severity and scope of
exposure could both reach very high levels, the combination of which could
produce disproportionate liability for a defendant whose only culpability
was a simple negligent act.
178. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 43, at 292 (stating that courts will refuse to
attempt any division in terms of foreseeable and unforeseeable injuries).
179. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (1997) (allowing statutory
damages of $100 to $1000); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (allowing treble civil damages for racketeering conduct); Civil Rights
Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b) (2003) (providing maximum compensatory and punitive
damages of $300,000 in Title VII and ADEA claims); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (Supp.
2003) (capping nonpecuniary wrongful death damages to $250,000); see also George L. Priest,
The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1535 (1987);
Kontorovich, supra note 144, at 515-17. Sometimes, however, courts provide judicial
limitations or modifications on damages, including caps or quasi-cap limitations. See State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (finding a single-digit ratio likely
satisfies due process); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (offering
three guideposts for reviewing constitutionality of punitive damages, and suggesting 10-1 ratio
of punitive to compensatory damages might be the constitutional limit in most cases).
180. As Rabin notes, there is a distinction between "mass tort liability," which refers to a
single event with a single causal link between the negligent act and injuries producing many
injuries, and the type of situation presented by negligent infliction of emotional distress and
economic loss claims where injuries are incurred at each link of the causal chain. Rabin, supra
note 37, at 1515 n.6. A massive train wreck would be an example of a mass tort. See Gottshall
v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 380 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Imagine that the employer negligently
caused a railroad accident in which fifty workers were killed or injured. That the employer's
liability depends, to some extent, on factors that it had no way of controlling is irrelevant for the
purpose of imposing liability."). The scope of exposure, as this article defines it, refers to both a
single and multiple causal link accident.
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A typical law school problem illustrates the point. A woman drives at 35
mph through a school district with a 25 mph speed limit while preoccupied
in a conversation on her cellphone. Suddenly, she realizes that a little boy
and his sister are crossing the street. She slams on the brake. Her 4000
pound SUV just misses the little girl by inches, brushing her skirt and arm
in the process, but hits the boy squarely. His legs are immediately torn off,
and his bloody body is thrown to the sidewalk. Other school children are
walking on this sidewalk and witness the horrific accident. The SUV then
hits a lamp post, which falls on a passing truck. The passenger in the truck
is hit by a glancing blow, but suffers severe physical injuries due to a
preexisting medical condition. The truck swerves and hits another lamp
post, which falls and rolls along the side of a hill for 50 yards until it
ruptures a gas line and triggers an explosion. The explosion sends flying
debris in a 100-yard radius, and a random golf-ball-size piece of rock hits a
golfer in the head as he is about to tee off and he dies from severe head
injuries.
Variations of this falling domino theme have appeared in countless law
school exams. The purpose is to show that the causal chain of events
resulting in physical injuries goes from reasonably foreseeable to arguably
foreseeable to just plain freakish, and liability ends at some point regardless
of the tragic consequences. In any analysis of foreseeability and defendant's
liability in the context of physical injuries, Palsgraf casts its shadow on
duty's reach. 8' Although a single accident could produce enormous
severity, the scope of exposure is in most cases naturally limited by the
physical and temporal happenstance of the accident and excludes
consequences that could not have been reasonably foreseen. 8 2 Aside from
181. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.).
182. I do not suggest that time and space limitations are legal limitations on foreseeability
or duty. They certainly are not. The defendant who sets a bomb which explodes years later, or
mails a box of poisoned food from California to Delaware, has caused the result and should
obviously bear the consequences. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 43, at 283, citing W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Preston, 254 F. 229 (3d Cir. 1918); People v. Botkin, 64 P. 286 (Cal. 1901).
There are also cancer and toxic tort cases involving long latency periods. See, e.g., Pierce v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020 (Md. 1983) (lung cancer from asbestosis
development years after exposure). See generally Robert J. Rhee, The Application of Finance
Theory to Increased Risk Harms in Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 111 (2004). In
such cases where the injury does not immediately follow the wrongful conduct, many
jurisdictions apply a special procedural rule (i.e., the discovery rule) to address the statute of
limitations issue. See, e.g., Childs v. Haussecker, 974 S.W.2d 31, 37-38 (Tex. 1998). But these
cases are driven by unusual facts or a particular disease's etiology, and not by such
unknowables as an individual's social fabric and mental fortitude. Most ordinary tort cases
involve accident and physical harm that tend to be confined, and thus serve a natural constraint
upon foreseeability and physically injured victims. This is not the case with mental injuries.
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the catastrophic accident, a negligent tortfeasor typically wreaks havoc on
"an unfortunate few."' 83
Now, consider the mental injuries involved in this hypothetical. Aside
from the little boy who suffered grievous physical injuries and related pain
and suffering, there are a number of other direct and collateral victims: the
boy's sister who was in the zone of danger-a bystander and a physical
impact victim; the children who witnessed this bloody accident; the father
who may have run to the accident scene moments later; the mother who
may have been 2500 miles away on a business trip; and so forth. Even the
most ordinary accident can emanate shock waves of injuries. The various
causal effects of the driver's negligence are eminently foreseeable, and the
liability fallout from simple inattention is potentially immense. Although
foreseeability sets tolerable limits on most physical injury claims, it
provides virtually no limit on liability for mental injuries. 84
183. Rabin, supra note 37, at 1532.
184. See Pearson, supra note 28, at 515 ("Although foreseeability has generally been
considered a requisite for recovery from a negligent defendant, it has never been sufficient in
and of itself."); Rabin, supra note 37, at 1526 ("Although [foreseeability] may set tolerable
limits for most types of physical harm, it provides virtually no limit on liability for nonphysical
harm."); see also Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 553 (1994) ("If one takes a
broad enough view, all consequences of a negligent act, no matter how far removed in time or
space, may be foreseen."); Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (Cal. 1989) ("[T]here are clear
judicial days on which a court can foresee forever and thus determine liability but none on
which that foresight alone provides a socially and judicially acceptable limit on recovery .... );
Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969) (foreseeability is "like the rippling of the
waters, without end").
The tragic events of the 9/11 terrorist attacks further illustrate the point. Assuming that the
events were due to catastrophic negligence of an airline pilot rather than a deliberate act of
terror, the extent of the aggregate personal injuries and property damage would be enormous,
approximately three thousand lives and about $90 billion in economic losses of which about $38
billion was insured. Werner Schadd, Terrorism-Dealing with the New Spectre, Swiss Re Focus
Report 4 (2002), available at http://www.swissre.com. Such catastrophic losses had been
contemplated and were foreseeable. See Munich Re Group, 11th September 2001, available at
http://www.munichre.com/publications/302-03092_en.pdf (noting airliner collision in a major
city was considered "possible" but not "probable" events by major underwriters); see also
World Trade Ctr. Props., LLC v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 345 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2003)
(stating the World Trade Center was insured for $3.5 billion "per occurrence" indicating that the
leaseholder anticipated catastrophic losses). Despite such foresight, it is questionable whether
the associated human suffering involved in such a catastrophe can be calculated even though it
could have been reasonably foreseeable. Cf Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 2002 WL
32153625 (Aug. 15, 2002) (complaint filed by families of the 9/11 victims against various
defendants; complaint asks for $116 trillion dollars and alleges among other things causes of
action for negligence (Count V) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VII));
Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (dismissing
some causes of action and defendants).
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Common law courts are right to reject foreseeability as the sole measure
of duty. 8 5 Mental injuries are not different from physical ones because they
are less debilitating or somehow less worthy of legal recognition. They are
different because they are not constrained by time and space proximity and
physical laws. 186 A car striking a victim at 100 mph will always produce
grievous physical injuries, and so defendants are on notice to refrain from
such conduct. But a near miss victim or a bystander to such a horrific
accident may or may not develop mental injuries (such is vagary of the
human mind). The natural order of things limits liability for physical
injuries far more efficiently than any judicial rule of law.'87 Mental injuries,
however, often transcend natural limitations and cross the vast expanses of
the human mind and heart. They are subject to the peculiar vagaries of the
network of human relationships and each person's unique stress tolerance,
and their etiology is far less predictable, and thus limiting liability becomes
problematic.'88 The negligent event could occur in one place and time, and
many days later cause severe injuries 2500 miles away. 189 Compounding the
problem is the "universal" nature of mental injuries. 9 ° One could go
through life without suffering from any substantial physical injury, but
death, sickness, and misfortune are inevitable.' 9' Extreme mental distress at
one point or another is a certainty. The common law has dealt with these
problems by rejecting the notion that all foreseeable plaintiffs are owed a
185. See, e.g., Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. 1988) (rejecting
foreseeability to define duty).
186. Compare Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 545 ("Emotional injuries may occur far removed in
time and space from the negligent conduct that triggered them.") with Pearson, supra note 28, at
507 ("The geographic risk of physical impact caused by the defendant's negligence in most
cases is quite limited, which accordingly limits the number of people subjected to that risk.
There is no similar finite range of risk for emotional harm.").
187. The severity and scope of exposure for mental injuries are more difficult to predict
than those of typical physical injuries because they depend on unpredictable psychological
factors. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 546.
188. See, e.g., Thing, 771 P.2d at 826 (finding that, although foreseeability sets limits for
physical injury claims, it provides virtually no limit mental injury claims) (citing Rabin, supra
note 37, at 1526); Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988) (foreseeability does not
necessarily give rise to a cause of action, and social policy must limit liability); Borer v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 861 (Cal. 1977) (same).
189. See, e.g., Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 532 P.2d 673, 676 (Haw. 1975).
190. See Thing, 771 P.2d at 835 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
191. See, e.g., Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675, 677 (N.J. 1989) (it is expected that injury or
death of one member of a family often produces severe emotional distress in others); Bowen v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432, 445 (Wis. 1994) (same). This was the crux of the
famous observation: "Life is difficult. This is a great truth, one of the greatest truths." M. SCOTT
PECK, M.D., THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED: A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF LOVE, TRADITIONAL VALUES
AND SPIRITUAL GROWTH 15 (1978).
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duty and by reducing the scope of exposure to only a small, finite subset of
foreseeable plaintiffs as a matter of law.
C. Inherent Biases in Common Law Approach
While the above policy reasons drove the debate, there were also subtle
biases that affected the development of early common law. These injuries
were dismissed as so evanescent, intangible, or peculiar that they cannot be
anticipated or reasonably connected to defendant's actions.192 This was
based on an antiquated misconception of science and nature, leading to an
attitude that only the weak would ever allow themselves to be injured by
fright or emotional trauma.'93 It was believed that as to the inevitable
stresses of living life-the accidents, injuries, deaths, and misfortunes-"a
certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law
could ever be."'94 Thus courts and even early commentators devalued
mental injuries, marginalizing them as the idiosyncratic predispositions of
the weak and fragile.'95
Commentators have noted a connection between this early attitude and
the fact that historically women tended to bring claims for mental distress
far more than men.'96 Many of the seminal cases in this field have been
brought by women plaintiffs,'97 and the earlier cases showed a distinctly
sexist perception of these claims.'98 In early common law, courts
marginalized a woman's claim for mental injuries in relation to the
defendant's conduct.'99 Mental injury claims are not gender specific, nor
192. See, e.g., Braun v. Craven, 51 N.E. 657, 659 (Ill. 1898); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.,
45 N.E. 354, 355 (N.Y. 1896); Chittick v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co., 73 A. 4, 8 (Pa. 1909). See
generally Thigpen, Note, supra note 39, at 181.
193. See Levit, supra note 146, at 172 n.182 (citing Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164
(Ill. 1961) ("Indiscriminate allowance of actions for mental anguish would encourage neurotic
overreactions to trivial hurts.")).
194. Magruder, supra note 58, at 1035.
195. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 1669 (noting the passing of overtly sexist
conceptions of women's interests).
196. See, e.g., Spearman v. McCrary, 58 So. 927 (Ala. Ct. App. 1912); Dillon v. Legg 441
P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968); Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 62 N.E. 737 (Mass. 1902); Mitchell,
45 N.E. at 354; Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 148 N.Y.S. 41 (App. Div. 1914); Lynch v. Knight,
11 Eng. Rep. 854 (1861); see also Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and
the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990); Handsley, supra note 144, at 391.
197. See, e.g., Dillon, 441 P.2d at 913.
198. Prosser notes that some judicial opinions expressed a masculine astonishment that any
woman could be frightened or shocked into, for instance, a miscarriage. PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 12, § 12, at 55-56.
199. Id.
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have tort rules been overtly gender discriminatory.2"0 Nevertheless, the early
common law's devaluation of mental injuries built in a structural bias that
ultimately disadvantaged women.20 '
Women were not the only class of disadvantaged plaintiffs. In seeking
meaningful distinctions, the courts went into the business of weighing the
legal value of relationships. In Elden, the California Supreme Court refused
to extend the Dillon bystander rule to unmarried cohabitants and was overt
about the discrimination, reasoning that marriage is the most socially
productive and fulfilling relationship in the course of a lifetime.20 2 Although
the court professed that its decision was not based on an anachronistic
203
notion of morality, it gave greater value to marriage than cohabitation
regardless of the individual nature of the relationship. Relationships were
judged along the lines of marriage, degrees of bloodline, and other status
classifications. While I do not suggest that these distinctions are
inappropriate in all areas of legal inquiry, to the extent that the intent is to
determine the strength of human relationship, the distinction is
discriminatory and irrational for human emotional bond is not a legal
form.20
4
The value assignments of relationships touch sensitive political and
social issues of today. Because almost all states do not recognize same-sex
marriages, 2 5 discrimination against unmarried cohabitants cut equally
across sexual orientation.20 6 The dissent in Elden raised the same-sex issue
directly in criticizing the reliance on marital status as a limit to the
bystander rule, and the Third Circuit in Gottshall alluded to the intersection
of tort law and the inevitable legal and political debate on same-sex
relationships.2 7 Currently, there are no cases that have allowed a plaintiff to
200. Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1259.
201. See Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 196, at 814.
202. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988).
203. Id. at 587.
204. See id. at 591 (Broussard, J., dissenting) ("The state's policy in favor of marriage,
however, does not imply a corresponding policy against nonmarital relationships. Nor does it
imply that the values underlying the state's interest in marriage flourish only within the confines
of that institution.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. The Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriages. In re Opinions of
the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
206. There is a constitutional right of privacy for same-sex relationships. Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
207. Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 372 (3d Cir. 1993) (Nygaard, J.)
("[S]tate courts have been wary of the public policy ramifications from recognizing certain
relationships for purposes of tort law .... One can easily see the public policy quagmire states
would be bogged in if they recognize other less traditional relationships for the purposes of
common law torts."); Elden, 758 P.2d at 592 n.2 (Broussard, J., dissenting) ("Though the
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recover for mental distress as a result of physical injuries suffered by a
same-sex partner, and at least one California appellate court rejected a claim
brought by a homosexual partner to recover for mental injury under the
Dillon bystander test.20 8 Although California is considered one of the most
liberal states in recognizing tort causes of actions, 29 a claim by a same-sex
partner clearly would not be cognizable under Elden absent legislative
intervention.210 Given that the legitimacy of same-sex privacy rights and
marriages is at the forefront of public policy debate, 21' courts would be
highly reluctant to tackle such a controversial and politicized issue by
granting same-sex partners tort rights arising from marital or blood relations
through the otherwise ordinary jurisprudence of negligent infliction of
emotional distress.
Although tort law in this field did not develop with a specific eye toward
discriminating against certain classes of individuals, courts have applied
value laden judgments when determining rules of liability. These judgments
then took legitimacy of precedent,21 2 particularly when superimposed over
majority has not directly addressed the question, presumably their position that marriage is the
sine qua non to recovery would preclude any gay or lesbian plaintiff from stating a Dillon cause
of action based on the injury of his or her partner.").
208. Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 876-77 (Ct. App. 1987).
209. Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1247 n.2; Gorback, supra note 37, at 273 n. 1.
210. As discussed, Elden created a bright line test by recognizing bystander liability for
married couples. In response to Elden and the highly publicized death of Diane Whipple (a
homosexual woman who was mauled to death by a neighbor's dogs), the California legislature
enacted a new law overruling Elden. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.01 (Deering Supp. 2002). See
Gorback, supra note 37, at 274-75. Section 1714.01(a) provides: "Domestic partners shall be
entitled to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress to the same extent that
spouses are entitled to do so under California law." CAL. CIv. CODE § 1714.01(a) (Deering
Supp. 2002).
211. It is clear that the legitimacy of same-sex marriages will occupy the debate within the
courts and legislatures. See supra note 204. See generally Gary Chartier, Natural Law, Same-
Sex Marriage, and the Politics of Virtue, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1593 (2001); Greg Johnson,
Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. REV. 15 (2000) (discussing
Vermont's An Act Relating to Civil Unions, 15 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (Supp. 2000),
which provides: "Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy,
common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage"); Mark
Strasser, Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and
Constitutional Guarantees, 33 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 597 (2002); W. Brian Burnette, Note, Hawaii's
Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act: An Effective Step in Resolving the Controversy Surrounding
Same-Sex Marriage, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 81 (1999) (discussing Hawaii's Reciprocal Beneficiaries
Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (Supp. 1997), which grants marriage-like benefits to homosexual
couples).
212. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 35, at 217 (stating that American jurisprudence
is built on the principle of stare decisis, that appellate decisions establish precedent). Stare
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the policy considerations of fraud, frivolity, and infinite liability. This
eventually provided a basis to legitimize the rules of law that are at its
foundation arbitrary on several levels.21 3 And these value laden judgments
still have a disparate impact on certain classes of people and will continue
to do so as long as courts seek legal distinctions in relationships and social
status that are best defined by an inquiry into the unique factual
circumstances of the case.
D. Nature of Arbitrary Rules
Most would agree that arbitrary laws are not good for society." 4 A rule
can be deemed arbitrary for several reasons. It can be arbitrary because it is
not supported by any policy, because it is vague or ambiguous, or because it
does not properly weigh the policies for which the rule was promulgated,
being either broader or narrower than the underlying policies would
suggest."5 Regardless of how unprincipled the common law rules are, it
cannot be said that they are not supported by any policy consideration and
therefore wholly irrational. Nor can it be said that they are vague or
ambiguous; to the contrary they are quite specific about their requirements.
The problem is that the common law tests are generally underinclusive, at
least when viewed through the prism of foreseeable plaintiffs.
Over the years, commentators and courts have explained that the
common law tests are instruments, however blunt, to distinguish
meritorious claims and limit liability in a way that the traditional notion of
duty is simply ill-equipped to handle. 21 6 These observations ring true. But
they do not filly explain how the various rules came to be. Historically,
courts could have gone in different directions. For example, they could have
acknowledged claims for mental injuries but limited liability by capping
actual damages or limiting recovery to out-of-pocket economic losses.217
They could have provided relief only for injuries confirmed by independent
decisis promotes predictability of the law so that the law's results are not seen as arbitrary. See
Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 709 (1913).
213. See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265, 309-10 (1978) ("[T]he
process at work was the reification of ad hoc social policies into 'values' or 'first principles'
that were then conceived to provide determinate-and therefore legitimate-solutions.").
214. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 31 (1996)
("Arbitrariness in the definition of the laws violates our essential expectations in living under
the rule of law.").
215. Pearson, supra note 28, at 478.
216. See supra pp. 809-10, 816-18.
217. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 37, at 1 (advocating damage limitation to economic loss).
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mental health professionals and physical manifestations.2 18 They could have
applied the traditional tort rules but imposed a higher evidentiary burden,
say, the clear and convincing standard.21 9 Or they could have continued to
reject these claims categorically. 2 °
Courts could have even created a bright line test where, upon a showing
of foreseeable injury, the legal cognizability of a claim could be determined
by whether the last digit of the civil docket number is even or odd. This
"civil docket" rule would be arbitrary on two levels: the rule is
underinclusive because not all injuries are remedied and it is internally.
inconsistent because precluded claims may be just as meritorious absent the
rule's application. Of course, in reality, the rule would never pass judicial
muster because such flip-of-the-coin justice would be decried as so
irrational as to be no justice at all. But to the extent that the common law
rules are underinclusive as to injured plaintiffs, do little to distinguish
between the genuine and feigned, and serve primarily to limit liability via
bright line tests that bear no logical nexus to a defendant's culpability or
plaintiff's injury, the analogy is not so tenuous. The point is that without a
principled approach to defining duty, common law courts as well as the
Supreme Court had no practical alternative other than to apply arbitrary
tests to serve the very important policy consideration of limiting liability to
socially tolerable levels.22'
This is not to suggest that the common law rules were entirely lacking
any basis in policy or fact. They employed a superficially rational
methodology. They could be understood as crude attempts to force mental
injury claims into the analytical framework of physical injury claims. The
physical manifestation test requires that an intangible mental injury
manifests itself into a palpable physical injury or symptoms. The physical
impact test conditions mental injury claims on the application of a physical
force upon the victim. The zone of danger and bystander tests limit claims
218. See, e.g., Nolan & Ursin, supra note 7, at 583 (recovery should be limited to cases of
serious emotional distress).
219. Cf Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32 & n.6 (1979) (some jurisdictions
require clear and convincing standard to impose punitive damages); Linthicum v. Nationwide
Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986) (recovery of punitive damages upon clear and
convincing evidence of the defendant's evil mind). But see Developments in the Law: The Civil
Jury, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1408, 1531-32 (1997) (stating that preponderance of evidence is the
traditional standard for punitive damages).
220. See Hubert Winston Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal
Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 285 (1944) ("Taking all cases decided
between 1850 and 1944, the net balance of justice would have been greater had all courts denied
damages for injury imputed to psychic stimuli alone.").
221. On this basis, Pearson advocated the zone of danger test as appropriate in light of the
policy considerations. Pearson, supra note 28, at 516.
846
36:0805] PRINCIPLED SOLUTION FOR NIED CLAIMS
to those within a physical and temporal proximity to the accident. Under
these frameworks, short intervals of time, distance, and happenstance could
separate liability for mental injury just as these random matters could
arbitrarily determine accidents and nonevents in everyday life.222 Viewed
this way, defendants and plaintiffs were left to reflect, There but for the
Grace of Court go I. Although fate may be random, courts should not
arbitrate fortune and bad luck and they must ask what is "the cost of such
institutionalized caprice, not only to the individuals involved, but to the
integrity of the judiciary as a whole." '223
IV. DUTY REDEFINED
A. The Palsgraf Problem
The common law's theoretical framework is built on the conceptual
foundation applicable to physical injuries. In most routine negligence
actions, foreseeability and causation are not routinely contested.224 Where,
however, the negligent act initiates a chain of events creating ripples of
injuries, as is the case with many claims for mental injuries, foreseeability
becomes the key issue. In this regard, the problem traces back to the
doctrinal development of Palsgraf225 The basic facts of this most celebrated
of all tort cases are well known: a man boarding a train was assisted by a
railway attendant, who dislodged a package of fireworks; the package
exploded on impact, causing a -scale to fall on the plaintiff who was
standing at one end of the platform; the plaintiff sued on the basis that the
railway attendant was negligent. 226 These facts provided Judge Cardozo the
opportunity to expound the theory that foreseeability defines duty. In this
case, Mrs. Palsgraf was not a foreseeable plaintiff in relation to a package
that fell on the train tracks and so there was no duty. On the other hand,
222. Of course, the critical distinction is that short intervals of time, distance, and
happenstance in most circumstance have no logical nexus to the injury or foreseeability, unlike
accidents involving a physical injury.
223. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 831 (Cal. 1989) (Kaufman, J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted).
224. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 405 (D. Utah 1984) ("In most
cases, the factual connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs injury is not genuinely
in dispute."), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). Consistent with this
observation, the unforeseeable or freakish accidents are few and far between.
225. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). Indeed, various
courts have invoked Palsgraf in this field. See supra pp. 817-18 and note 123.
226. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 99.
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Judge Andrews's dissent relied on a proximate cause analysis to reason that
the defendant's conduct is legally wrong whenever it falls below the
reasonable person standard and causes injury absent practical policy
considerations that warrant a limitation of liability.227 Although the opinion
was a 4-3 majority, Judge Cardozo's concept of foreseeability gained
prominence in American jurisprudence.228 Judge Cardozo's opinion was
prescient, suggesting in dictum the possibility that negligence could "entail
liability for any and all consequences, however novel or extraordinary. 229
Of course, when the case was decided in 1928, mental injury claims were
just being recognized as an independent tort and were generally considered
novel.
Despite its prominence in law practice and academic review, Palsgraf is
an enigma in many ways. 231 For one, the exact nature of Mrs. Palsgraf's
injury was not stated in the opinion. Given that the case dealt with a large
explosion and a scale falling on the plaintiff,232 most readers would assume,
without more, that the injury was a physical one. 33 This assumption is
implied by both Judge Cardozo and Andrews, who spoke in terms of "the
right to bodily security" and "the safety of others., 234 In fact, however, the
injury for which Mrs. Palsgraf sued was a speech impediment brought on by
the accident.235 At trial, evidence was introduced that Mrs. Palsgraf suffered
from "traumatic hysteria., 236 Judge Cardozo was deliberately elliptical in
227. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
228. The concept was almost immediately adopted by the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. c (1965). Nevertheless, Palsgraf is far from a universal doctrine.
See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 302 (1998) (arguing that social and economic factors
such as spreading of losses to "deep pockets" have resulted in the Andrews approach gaining
popularity); see also Prosser, supra note 22, at 1 (noting disagreement and confusion in treating
and interpreting Palsgra).
229. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
230. See supra Part II.A, pp. 813-18 and accompanying notes.
231. Prosser describes Palsgraf s ruling as a "riddle." Prosser, supra note 22, at 28 (citing
Thomas Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case, 23 MINN. L. REv. 46 (1938)).
232. The New York Times reported that the explosion shattered windows, ripped away
parts of the train platform, overturned a penny weighing machine, and injured at least thirteen
people. Bomb Blast Injures 13 in Station Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1924, at 1 [hereinafter
Bomb Blast].
233. Indeed, the scale hit her arm, hip, and thigh. NOONAN, supra note 106, at 127.
234. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100, 102.
235. See NOONAN, supra note 106, at 127 (noting the injury as "a stammer"); RICHARD A.
POSNER, CARDOzO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 35 (1990) (same).
236. TORTS STORIES 4 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003); see NOONAN,
supra note 106, at 127 (describing the injury as "hysteria"). The nature of the injury was first
suggested by a New York Times article on the accident, which described Mrs. Palsgraf's injury
as "shock." Bomb Blast, supra note 232, at 1. At trial, an expert physician testified "her mind is
disturbed." NOONAN, supra note 106, at 127. Subsequently, Mrs. Palsgraf became completely
[Ariz. St. L.J.
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this regard for if the true nature of the injury was revealed in the opinion it
"would have made the accident seem not only freakish but silly, a put-on, a
fraud., 23 7 Additionally, if the injury was described as "shock," a
quintessential case for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the case
would not have had the influence Judge Cardozo intended in the issue of
foreseeability and scope of duty as the case would have been easily
distinguishable from most other accidents or relegated to the unique
jurisprudence of mental injuries.238
But herein is one of the ironies of Palsgraf When foreseeability was
applied to actions for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the concept
has historically been problematic.239 Ultimately, the legal marketplace
rejected foreseeability, a concept originally devised to limit liability to "the
range of reasonable apprehension,""24 for fear of infinite liability. Instead, in
seeking social limits courts have gravitated toward the methodology
suggested by Judge Andrews. He recognized that his causation analysis did
nothing to curtail the potential for infinite liability,241 and so he counseled
courts to "take account" of the matter and create "practical" rules of
expediency that serve the social policies in determining appropriate limits to
liability, 242 which is precisely what the common law courts have done in this
field.
A second irony of Palsgraf arises from another factual ambiguity. The
opinion does not indicate the precise distance between the spot of the
explosion and the falling scale, mentioning only that the scale was "at the
mute. Walter Otto Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual and Relevance, 66 CAL. L. REv. 699,
706 n.25 (1978). Judge Posner speculates that the "likeliest explanation for Mrs. Palsgraf s
speech difficulties is that the accident triggered a latent psychiatric problem that the litigation
made even worse." POSNER, supra note 235, at 36.
237. POSNER, supra note 235, at 42. Kaufman explains the omission of facts pertaining to
Mrs. Palsgrafs injury by citing one of Judge Cardozo's lectures: "There is an accuracy that
defeats itself by the over-emphasis of details .. .one must permit oneself, and that quite
advisedly and deliberately, a certain margin of misstatement." KAUFMAN, supra note 228, at
297-98; see TORTS STORIES, supra note 236, at 5 (noting that the case would have had limited
influence if it was recognized as a "shock" case).
238. Judge Cardozo deliberately chose to leave out details to avoid the problem that a
"sentence may be so overloaded with all its possible qualifications that it will tumble down of
its own weight." KAUFMAN, supra note 228, at 298 (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, LAW AND
LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 7-8 (1931)). At the time, the common law jurisdictions had
not even developed the zone of danger test.
239. See supra Part II, pp. 813-31 and accompanying notes.
240. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
241. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 43, at 287; see Prosser, supra note 22, at 24
("Causation cannot be the answer; in a very real sense the consequences of an act go forward to
eternity, and back to the beginning of the world.").
242. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 104 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
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other end of the platform, many feet away., 243 Based on this elliptical
reference, Judge Cardozo opined that the defendant's conduct was not a
wrong in relation to the plaintiff "standing far away. 244 Some have
questioned the implied great distance, which made the accident seem all the
more unforeseeable.245 In fact, the scale was a relatively short distance
away, "more than ten feet away" as reported by the New York Times, 246
about 25 to 30 feet as estimated by Judge Andrews, 247 and about 25 to 40
feet as estimated by one commentator.248 The exact distance, however, did
not matter because Judge Cardozo adopted a zone of danger analysis.2 49 The
court's subsequent response to the motion for reconsideration clarified: "If
we assume that the plaintiff was nearer the scene of the explosion than the
prevailing opinion would suggest, she was not so near that injury from a
falling package, not known to contain explosives, would be within the range
of reasonable prevision., 25" Accordingly, Palsgraf a mental injury action
masquerading as a physical injury case, incorporates into its foreseeability
analysis the notion of spatial relationship between the defendant's
culpability and the plaintiffs injury, which is found in both the zone of
danger test adopted by Waube and the bystander test adopted by Dillon.25'
While the problem in this field traces its roots to the doctrinal
developments of Palsgraf, the opinion leaves clues to a principled solution.
Judges Cardozo believed that wrongful conduct does not exist in a
243. Id. at 99.
244. Id.
245. See POSNER, supra note 235, at 39 (stating that the record does not disclose the
location of the scale or its distance from the explosion). But see KAUFMAN, supra note 228, at
298 (noting that Mrs. Palsgraf's daughter testified that she was at the newsstand, which "was
quite a distance; it was at the other end of the platform") (emphasis omitted). At trial, Mrs.
Palsgraf was asked "And how near were you to the place where the explosion took place?" and
she answered "That I can't exactly tell; I don't know what train took the explosion." TORTS
STORIES, supra note 236, at 3.
246. Bomb Blast, supra note 232, at 1.
247. Palsgraf 162 N.E. at 105.
248. KAUFMAN, supra note 228, at 655 n.31.
249. Id. at 298; see Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101 ("[T]here was nothing in the situation to
suggest to the most cautious mind that the parcel wrapped in newspaper would spread wreckage
through the station."). It is interesting to note that several years later Judge Cardozo spoke
specifically in terms of a "zone of danger" when describing the duties of plaintiff and defendant
in a railway accident. Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934).
250. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 164 N.E. 564, 564 (N.Y. 1928) (per curiam). Given
that Judge Cardozo wrote the opinion, this response was probably written by him. KAUFMAN,
supra note 228, at 655 n.32.
251. KAUFMAN, supra note 228, at 301. See supra pp. 817-21 and accompanying notes for
a discussion of the zone of danger and bystander tests.
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philosophical vacuum. It is defined by a relationship,252 a concept the
dissent begrudgingly admitted.2 53 The key ideological divide concerned the
thing related to. The dissent believed that negligence involves the
relationship between individuals, and so the interest protected is the
freedom from any injury proximately caused by the defendant.254 Judge
Cardozo rejected this view and elevated the argument to a more abstract
level.255 Freedom from injury in and of itself was not a protected interest.256
Rather, duty is defined by a relationship between the conduct and the
interest at risk.2
57
In Palsgraf, that interest was drawn along the line of foreseeable and
unforeseeable plaintiffs. This distinction, however, need not be the sole
consideration under which duty is defined. Judge Cardozo spoke in terms of
the "diversity of interests., 258 He recognized the possibility of alternative
distinctions used to define duty as expressed in this oft-ignored dictum:
There is room for argument that a distinction is to be drawn
according to the diversity of interests invaded by the act, as where
conduct negligent in that it threatens an insignificant invasion of
an interest in property results in an unforeseeable invasion of an
interest of another order, as, e.g., one of bodily security. Perhaps
other distinctions may be necessary.
259
It is apparent that Judge Cardozo considered specific gradations of
foreseeability for the diversity of interests involved,260 but the facts of the
252. "Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation. Negligence in the abstract, apart from
things related, is surely not a tort, if indeed it is understandable at all." Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at
101.
253. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
254. "In an empty world negligence would not exist. It does involve a relationship between
man and his fellows, but not merely a relationship between man and those whom he might
reasonably expect his act would injure; rather, a relationship between him and those whom he
does in fact injure." Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 101.
256. Id. (stating that the cause of action is not established by showing damages).
257. Id. at 99-100 (defendant's conduct must be "with reference to" the plaintiff, who "sues
in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of
duty to another").
258. Id. at 101.
259. Id. (emphasis added). Prosser notes that there is almost no authority advancing this
dictum. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 43, at 289. Although the First Restatement
adopted this dictum, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. g (1934), the Second
Restatement subsequently rejected the view, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmt. j
(1965).
260. Although this concept was accepted by some commentators, others have looked
askance at the prospect of creating hair-splitting distinctions, or recognizing broad,
unreasonable categories. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 43, at 289-90.
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case did not allow further exploration. In hinting at finer gradations he
provided, unknowingly perhaps, the doctrinal key to solving the problem
specific to claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In this field, commentators and courts have treated foreseeability,
culpability and resulting injury as singular concepts.2"' The choice has been
stark: accept either foreseeability as the measure of duty or arbitrary rules as
the limit on liability.262 As for assessed damages, once an injury is
determined to be severe and genuine, the inquiry stops and damages do not
relate to a defendant's culpability other than through causation. My
proposal rejects this analytical framework. We start with this logical
certainty: if we accept the premise that defendants owe some form of duty
to all foreseeable, injured plaintiffs and that foreseeability is an inadequate
concept to limit liability to tolerable levels, then afortiori other distinctions
are necessary to balance these competing policies. Such distinctions are not
only possible, but inevitable.
The common law analysis is lacking not because it makes no
distinctions, but because the distinctions made are arbitrary. The analysis
fails because, as discussed, mental injuries are unpredictable and transient
and because the causal nexus between the negligent act and injury is more
elastic.263 Considering this, we do not expect society to walk on eggshells
fearing that any conduct that fails to meet an objective standard of proper
behavior may result in significant liability. The universal nature of mental
injuries raises the specter of unlimited and unpredictable liability,
particularly in a society that has developed an "intolerance of bad luck" to
the extent that victims are deemed to be entitled to compensation.2"
Ideally, every person should have a right to be free from the imposition
of wrongful conduct that would cause injuries. If this were not the case, a
dogmatic adherence to deterrence theory aside,265 the philosophical
261. See supra Part III.B, pp. 836-42 and accompanying notes.
262. The Supreme Court has recognized the state of the law has been an all-or-arbitrary
choice. See Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 438 (1997) (suggesting
that some plaintiffs must go without remedies if the rule of law "would on balance cause more
harm than good").
263. See supra pp. 841-42 and accompanying notes.
264. Jon T. Hirschoff, Recent Developments in the Law of Torts-ntroduction, 51 IND. L.J.
463 (1976); see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978) (stating that a central goal of tort
law is to compensate persons) (citing 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, LAW OF TORTS
§ 25.1, at 1299 (1956)); Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311, 318 (2d Cir.
1999) (same).
265. Deterrence theory of torts provides that tort laws exist primarily to regulate conduct
and to deter socially unproductive conduct. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 1646-47
(discussing that the deterrence theory does not fully explain the nature and justification of tort
law).
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justification for compensation would be undermined. But it is not enough to
characterize a plaintiffs interest as freedom from mental injuries inflicted
by the defendant as this would lead invariably back to a foreseeability
analysis. Where traditional analysis fails, an alternative approach is
required.266 Foreseeability and genuine injury are prerequisite requirements
to assert a mental injury claim-the start of the inquiry and not the end.267
The question remains: What is a wrong?
A wrong does not exist in a vacuum. Duty is a term of relation. Although
the same conduct produces the same mental injuries in two plaintiffs, it does
not follow that the defendant is equally liable to both. For physical injury
claims, the relation was cut along foreseeability. In Palsgraf terms, it
matters whether Mrs. Palsgraf was injured by a falling scale at the other end
of the train platform or whether she was injured by the package of
explosives falling directly on her, even though the resulting injury and
culpable conduct may have been the same. For mental injury claims, the
relation is between culpability and the interest violated. This notion is
independent of foreseeability, causation and any arguable right to mental
tranquility. The relationship between a plaintiffs interest and defendant's
culpability is a dynamic calculus, the end product of which should affect
both the rules of liability and damage. Because mental injuries are transient,
unpredictable and universal, the class of foreseeable plaintiffs is a large,
amorphous group who are increasingly connected in this modem era by
technological advances in transportation and communication. Because the
causal links differ from plaintiff to plaintiff in this universe, we can fairly
ask: What is the nature of plaintiffs interest? How and why was the
plaintiff injured? How does the defendant's conduct relate to the plaintiff s
interest and injury? To answer these questions, we start with the interests at
stake.
B. Classes of Plaintiff's Interests
This article identifies two broad interests at stake that divide the universe
of foreseeable plaintiffs into direct and collateral victim classes. The direct
266. Speaking as to a claim for future medical monitoring in FELA actions, the Supreme
Court suggested: "The reality is that competing interests are at stake-and those interests
sometimes can be reconciled in ways other than simply through the creation of a full-blown,
traditional, tort law cause of action." Buckley, 521 U.S. at 444.
267. Foreseeability and severe injury are the first level analysis in these claims. Without
either, the plaintiff would have no claim. No court or commentator has ever suggested that
unforeseeable plaintiffs are entitled to relief. Moreover, few commentators have suggested that
trivial claims should be compensated. But see Bell, supra note 7, at 382-91 (suggesting a
nominal fixed dollar amount of four hundred dollars to five hundred dollars for trivial claims).
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victim class is defined by the circumstance where the defendant's act or
omission adversely affects the victim's sense of personal safety or personal
interests. Personal interest does not include interest in the well-being of
others. In one sense, the well-being of others is of personal interest, but here
the interest defined is that of the autonomous self.268 The direct victim class
is a close approximation of the plaintiff class if mental injuries behaved
more like physical ones and did not have their transient, unpredictable
quality. The direct victim class includes the physical impact and zone of
danger tests because the defendant's negligence can be said to be "directed"
at the victim. 269 It recognizes the special circumstances where the common
law has long permitted recovery though they do not fairly fit into any of the
standard tests, those situations including mishandling of corpses and fear of
disease cases.270 Importantly, the direct victim class expands liability to a
whole host of situations where the common law may not recognize a cause
of action. These can encompass situations where a defendant and a plaintiff
have a preexisting relationship in fact or law-attorney/client,27'
insurer/insured, 72 creditor/debtor,273 physician/patient,274 former intimate
partners, 275 etc.-in addition to situations where the defendant's conduct
fails to be sufficiently extreme and outrageous for the purposes of a cause of
268. The distinction made here is that the defendant's conduct must have a primary effect
on the plaintiff. A defendant's conduct is said to be like a stone thrown in a pond, with
"ramifying consequences, like the rippling of the waters, without end." Consol. Rail Corp. v.
Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 553 (1994) (quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y.
1969)) (internal quotations omitted). The question is not whether each procession of human
events and causality was foreseeable, but whether the defendant's conduct threatened the
plaintiff directly.
269. I do not imply a scienter element that is higher than the negligence standard of care.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283. Negligent conduct can be intentionally directed
against a particular victim without malicious intent, or can apply against the victim without any
forethought. See Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1985) (defendant's negligence is
"by its very nature directed at" plaintiff).
270. See supra notes 44-45. Erroneous transmission of death notices fall into the collateral
interest class because the injury arises out of the death or injury of another though the
information later proves to be false.
271. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Grinde, 534 N.W.2d 414, 416, 423 (Iowa 1995) (cause of action
not recognized).
272. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 426 P.2d 173, 175, 179 (Cal.
1967) (claim for emotional distress arising from an insurance dispute).
273. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 502 A.2d 1057, 1059, 1064-65 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1986) (cause of action not recognized).
274. See, e.g., Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1198 (Cal. 1992); Marlene F. v.
Affiliated Psychiatric Med. Clinic, Inc., 770 P.2d 278, 278 (Cal. 1989); Molien v. Kaiser Found.
Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 814, 821 (Cal. 1980). These cases are discussed further infra pp. 858-60.
275. See, e.g., Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex. 1993) (claim for emotional
distress arising from cruel and callous acts by a former intimate partner).
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action under intentional infliction of emotional distress but that is
nevertheless directed at the plaintiff and is socially undesirable.276
On the other hand, the collateral victim class is comprised of those
injured where the defendant's conduct results in death or injury to another,
and such death or injury is either witnessed by or communicated to the
victim. The collateral victim class includes bystanders who satisfy the
common law tests in all of its different flavors.277 It also encompasses those
who would fail to meet the common law tests, including bystanders who are
closely related to the victim but fail the relational element, or non-
bystanders who fail the spatial or temporal elements of the Dillon test. So
this class includes closely related persons by fact (e.g., like the friend of
fifteen years in Gottshall),278 the "near miss" bystander (e.g., those who
immediately arrive at the scene of the accident like the mother in Thing),
279
and those who were closely related to the accident victim regardless of the
proximity of distance or time (e.g., like the father who was 2500 miles away
in Kelley).28°
If foreseeability is the sole measure of duty and liability, then this
dichotomy between direct and collateral victims would be just another
arbitrary bright line. A distinction without principle is no distinction at all,
and the proposed dichotomy would suffer the same flaw as the common law
rules, no better or worse. But my thesis depends on foreseeability only as a
prerequisite to recovery, an inquiry into whether a duty could exist or not.
Once it is determined that a defendant owes some level of duty, then the
issues are the scope of that duty and the type of liability imposed. These
matters do not depend on foreseeability. This dichotomy between direct and
collateral interests is justified on three levels.
First, as a normative proposition, the interests of direct victims rank
higher than those of collateral victims. For direct victims, the fundamental
derivative interest is a right to self-preservation. While it would be
incongruous to discuss a class of ordinary tort claims in terms of an elevated
276. See, e.g., id at 600. In Boyles, the defendant videotaped a sexual encounter with the
plaintiff, and then showed the tape to various people. Upon learning of this indecency, the
plaintiff suffered severe mental injuries and sought psychological counseling. The Texas
Supreme Court declined to recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress under these facts, reasoning that tort law should not compensate "for every instance of
rude, insensitive or distasteful" conduct though that conduct may result in foreseeable mental
injuries. Id. at 602.
277. See supra Part II.B, pp. 8 18-23 and accompanying notes.
278. Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 566 F.3d 530, 532 (3d Cir. 1995).
279. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
280. Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 532 P.2d 673, 676 (Haw. 1975).
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philosophical discussion of natural rights,281 and that is not the intent here,
the interest derives from a person's fundamental right to exist, which is
consistent with the interest to be free of harm from wrongful conduct as
recognized by traditional tort law.282 At its core, tort law involves a
transactional connection between a plaintiff and a defendant, where the
defendant has acted upon the plaintiff in a manner that causes injuries.2 83
Under this framework, a direct victim is the party acted upon and is closest
in transactional proximity to the culpable conduct, and the defendant and
plaintiff stand together as conjoined participants in an accident.2 84
Conversely, the true interest of a collateral victim is the safety or well-
being of others. The injury here derives from a violation of another person's
interest in self-preservation. Liability is best understood as derivative of the
relationship with the primary victim, whether in fact by some preexisting
relationship or in law by a temporal and spatial connection to the
accident.285 Unlike the common law bystander, a collateral victim has a
derivative right to sue based on a relationship to the accident, meaning that
the contemporaneous witnessing of the accident may be sufficient to merit
remedy even if the plaintiff is not "closely related" as defined by the
common law.286 In these cases, however, we must recognize that the
connection between defendant and collateral victim is a quantum more
distant and causality is more elastic.
The interest of direct victims is of a higher order because "all duties are
derivative from the fundamental and inalienable right of self-
281. Pearson, Response to Bell, supra note 66, at 415-16. Bell justified a freedom from
mental injuries as an entitlement under a Rawlsian "original state" analysis. Bell, supra note 7,
at 341-44 (relying on J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1971)). Pearson criticized this
approach on the basis that Rawls did "not deal with rules of law at this low a level of
abstraction." Pearson, Response to Bell, supra note 66, at 415.
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 7 (1965). There is an inverse principle in tort law as
well. The right to self-protection and self-preservation is a defense to a tort claim, i.e., the right
to commit an otherwise tortious act on another. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 70, at 159 (2000).
283. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 1684 (citing ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 81 (1995)).
284. Id.
285. See id. at 1664 n.99 (liability is a "derivative" action arising from the familial
relationship similar to wrongful death and loss of consortium actions).
286. These are primarily plaintiffs who witness a traumatic accident, and who suffer severe
injuries as a result. In the previous hypothetical involving the negligent driver in the school
zone, the school children who witness a gruesome accident are foreseeable victims. See supra
pp. 839-40. Of course, those who are not "closely related" to the accident victim and who are
not present at the scene of the accident are certainly unforeseeable victims.
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preservation. ' Those who have been harmed by fear for self are really the
primary victims, and the others' harms are secondary and derive from the
threat to the primary victim. This is so even though the injuries are
qualitatively or normatively indistinguishable, arise from the same negligent
act and are equally foreseeable. This conclusion can be reached by
comparing two hypothetical scenarios. The first scenario is the classic
bystander fact pattern: a defendant's negligence physically injures Harry
and the damages are calculated at $100; his sister, Sally, witnesses the
accident and suffers mental injuries calculated at $100; both Harry and
Sally are equally foreseeable; both injuries are real and severe. The second
scenario is a variation of Palsgraf. the defendant's negligence caused
mental injury on Harry, who was in the zone of danger; Sally was off in the
distance, safely away from any physical peril; Sally witnessed the imminent
danger to her brother, but instead of suffering mental injury she fainted and
broke her arm. In both scenarios, we assume that the jurisdiction does not
make a normative distinction between physical and mental injury; that
damages are legislatively capped per occurrence at $100; that remedies are
limited under statute to the "primary" victim, which the statute does not
define but is left to the interpretation of the courts; and that both Harry and
Sally suffered foreseeable injuries valued at $100. Who gets the damages?
The problem is one of distributing remedies, and the solution depends on
whose interest ranks higher. I propose that the more deserving plaintiff in
both cases is Harry, who was the focal recipient of the defendant's
negligence and causally nearer to the accident. Only because of Harry's
injury was Sally, too, injured; and so Sally's injury is derivative of Harry's
and is further down the causal chain of events. This is not to suggest that
Sally is not deserving of legal protection, but that her interest is of a lesser
order in a world of limited remedies.
287. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 181 (1953). Strauss explained Thomas
Hobbes's theory of the natural right to self-preservation:
If, then, natural law must be deduced from the desire for self-preservation, if,
in other words, the desire for self-preservation is the sole root of all justice
and morality, the fundamental moral fact is not a duty but a right; all duties
are derivative from the fundamental and inalienable right of self-
preservation. There are, then, no absolute or unconditional duties; duties are
binding only to the extent to which their performance does not endanger our
self-preservation. Only the right of self-preservation is unconditional or
absolute.
Id. Strands of this philosophy have appeared in tort doctrines. See, e.g., Laidlaw v. Sage, 52
N.E. 679, 685 (N.Y. 1899) (holding that a defendant who deliberately caused the injury of
another in an effort to save himself is not liable for battery and noting "self-preservation is the
first law of nature").
857
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
Second, the above public choice problem illustrates the main deficiency
in a foreseeability analysis. Foreseeability has been a singular concept
measured only by the reasonable person standard. This concept generally
works for physical injuries due to the expected properties of physical
injuries and accidents. Because the ripple effects of a negligent act extend
far broader for mental injuries, the classification of direct and collateral
interests serves as a gradation of reasonable foreseeability. Just as the chain
of causal links is scrutinized to determine whether an accident was
foreseeable or freakish in physical accidents, the causal elasticity and the
varying interests can be scrutinized to qualitatively distinguish the
otherwise singular concept of foreseeability. My observation is that direct
victims are closer in proximity to the negligent act and the defendant, and
their personal interests are of a higher order in relation to the negligent
conduct. These facts are relevant to whether liability should attach and
under what circumstances, and therefore they can and should be considered
in determining both the rules of liability and damage.288
Third, evidence of the dichotomy between direct and collateral interests
is seen in existing case law where courts have struggled to find principled
alternatives to the all-or-arbitrary choice. After announcing Dillon,
California continued to experiment in this field. The decisions in Thing and
Elden reflected a growing dissatisfaction with a trend toward a pure
foreseeability test, or a variant thereof2 8 9 New factual circumstances
continued to test the old doctrines, and California searched for other
solutions.
In Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,29 ° a hospital misdiagnosed a
woman as having syphilis. 91 The wife believed that she contracted the
disease from her husband, and subsequent tensions led to a divorce. 92 The
husband sued the hospital for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 93
The hospital correctly argued that the husband could not satisfy the three-
prong Dillon test. 94 The court acknowledged that the husband was not a
bystander in the mold of Dillon, but nevertheless held that the husband was
a foreseeable plaintiff.2 95 Reasoning that misdiagnosis of the wife's
288. See infra Part V.A, pp. 865-67 and accompanying notes for a discussion of the
proposed standard.
289. See supra pp. 820-21 and accompanying notes.
290. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
291. Id. at 814.
292. Id. at 814-15.
293. Id. at 815.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 816.
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condition could equally affect the husband's mental tranquility, the court
held that the husband was a "direct victim" of the defendant's negligence.296
Subsequent cases have elaborated on the distinction between direct and
indirect victims. In Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic,
Inc. ,297 a mother and son sought psychiatric treatment for family problems.
In the course of therapy, the doctor molested the son and the mother
brought suit for her mental injuries.'" The court permitted the action. It first
reasoned that the therapist owed a duty not only to the mother and son
individually but also to the "family relationship," and therefore he should
have known that molestation would "directly injure" the mother as well as
the parent-child relationship. 99 This reasoning allowed the court to
conclude that although the physical abuse was directed at the son, "the
therapist's tortious conduct was accordingly directed against both."3 °0
Three years later, in Burgess v. Superior Court, a mother sued a doctor
for mental injuries caused by her post-delivery learning of injuries to her
child during delivery."' The court announced that California has two
"theories" of recovery: the bystander theory under Dillon and the "direct
victim" theory under Molien. °2 The mother did not contemporaneously
witness the injuries to her child because she was under anesthesia, thus
failing the Dillon test. But the court found liability based on the "direct
victim" theory. In seeking to clarify an admittedly confusing dichotomy
created by Molien and Marlene F. ,303 the court held that a cause of action
exists in cases where a duty arising from a preexisting relationship created
by fact or law is breached and this preexisting relationship determines
whether a plaintiff was a "direct victim.
304
The line of cases in Molien, Marlene F., and Burgess did not provide
clear guidelines on the distinction between "direct" and "bystander"
296. Id. at 816-17. The court's analysis was guided by the Hawaii Supreme Court's
decision in Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970). See supra pp. 821-22 and
accompanying notes.
297. 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989).
298. Id. at 279.
299. Id. at 282.
300. Id. at 283.
301. 831 P.2d 1197, 1198-99 (Cal. 1992).
302. Id. at 1197.
303. Id. at 1200 (noting that the "direct victim" designation has tended to obscure, rather
than explain the problem).
304. The "direct victim" theory applies where there is a breach of duty "assumed by the
defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of relationship
between the two." Id. at 1201 (quoting Marlene F., 770 P.2d at 282) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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victims.3 °5  Interestingly, all three cases involved a doctor-patient
relationship and mental injuries arising from this relationship.30 6 The
analyses, taken together, are driven with the end in mind-not letting
healthcare providers get away with negligence or other more egregious
conduct-and the existence of a doctor-patient relationship in each of these
cases was convenient to fit the "direct victim" theory. The cases show,
however, that California latched on to some intuitive sense of a distinction
in the varying interests of plaintiffs.3 7 In proposing the dichotomy between
direct 'and collateral victims, this article does not adopt the California line of
cases. It presents a set of principles under which analysis becomes less
arbitrary than under the current scheme; and so the concept advanced here is
conceptually broader and, hopefully, clearer in the statement of the rule and
its application.
The concept of direct and collateral victims has been recognized in other
areas of tort law. Similar to claims for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, actions for negligent infliction of economic loss pose the same
problem of a large, indeterminate class and the potential for liability ad
infinitum.30 8 The ripple effects of negligently inflicted economic loss are an
ever-widening arc of foreseeable consequences. In these cases, courts have
generally refused to recognize a cause of action.30 9 But similar to the way
305. Even the California Supreme Court has admitted that the distinction between
"bystander" and "direct" victim has created an "amorphous nether realm" and has contributed to
the difficulty in defining duty. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 823 (Cal. 1989).
Commentators have suggested the same. See Pearson, supra note 28, at 515 (finding the
distinction is "analytically unsound"); Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1269 (finding the
distinction does not provide sufficient guidelines).
306. Commentators have suggested that the distinction rests on a "special relationship"
defined in Marlene F. See Julie A. Davies, Direct Actionsfor Emotional Harm: Is Compromise
Possible?, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1992); Greenberg, supra note 144, at 1286.
307. See infra note 343 for a discussion of the post-Molien cases.
308. Rabin, supra note 37, at 1526.
309. See, e.g., Dundee Cement Co. v. Chem. Labs., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166, 1169 (7th Cir.
1983); Neb. Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa
1984). Almost as corollary to the rule against economic loss, the law proscribes recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress brought about by economic loss. See, e.g., Branch v.
Homefed Bank, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 184-85 (Ct. App. 1992) ("We restate that which we believe
to be settled law, namely that damages for emotional distress are ordinarily not recoverable in
an action for negligent misrepresentation when the injury other than the emotional distress is
only economic."); see Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1268 ("The proscription against
recovery for emotional injury when the underlying harm is economic is nearly universal."). The
general prohibition against recovery applies to situations where there is an interference with an
existing contract or where there is no contract at all. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.
Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927) (Holmes, J.) ("A tort to the person or property of one man does
not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract
with that other .. "); Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903) (no contractual relationship).
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the law has carved out special exceptions in the field of negligent infliction
of emotional distress,31 the law of negligent infliction of economic loss has
recognized special circumstances on an ad hoc basis.31" ' In particular, a
discemable line of cases has recognized an exception in the area of
professional services." 2 In analyzing this line of cases, Rabin distilled the
legal principle: When the intended beneficiary is "directly" harmed-a
concept indicating that the plaintiff was one of a small class particularly
intended to benefit from the defendant's activity-recovery is granted; on
the other hand, if the plaintiff is one of a general category of potential third-
party beneficiaries, such as investors or lenders who might rely on an
accountant's audit statement, recovery is denied.313 In these cases, courts
have distinguished direct and collateral economic loss as best they can,
sometimes drawing arbitrary lines where the concern for widespread
liability outweighs the particular interest of the case.3 14
Absent infinite resources to compensate for every "wrong," a finer grade
of distinction is needed. Accordingly, we can distinguish between harm
caused when the stone is thrown into the pond, and the ripple effect of harm
further along in the causal chain. Therefore, the article's dichotomy between
direct and collateral victims is rational, supported by traditional tort
principles, and is less arbitrary.
310. See supra pp. 814-15 and notes 44-45 (discussing special circumstances such as
erroneous death notices, mishandling of corpses, and cancerphobia cases).
311. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (allowing
recovery for economic losses of fishermen after oil spill); see also In re Exxon Valdez, 104 F.3d
1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 1997) (barring recovery for Alaska natives' economic losses after an oil
spill); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991) (urging other remedies for
economic loss); Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1994) (suggesting recovery for economic losses be barred due to
alternative remedies).
312. Rabin, supra note 37, at 1527 & n.42 (citing Earp v. Nobmann, 175 Cal. Rptr. 767,
778-80 (Ct. App. 1981) (real estate broker); Brousseau v. Jarett, M.D., 141 Cal. Rptr. 200, 203-
04 (Ct. App. 1977) (physician); Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 728-29 (Ct. App. 1976)
(architect); M. Miller Co. v. Cent. Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 18 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961) (engineer)).
313. Id. at 1527-28 (analyzing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931)
(Cardozo, J.); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.); and their progeny);
cf Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying motorist's claim for
losses from higher gasoline prices resulting from the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
314. Rabin, supra note 37, at 1538; see Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1248, 1274-75
(distinguishing between "primary, direct victim" and other collateral victims in proposing a
standard for negligent infliction of emotional distress for economic losses).
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C. Classes of Defendant's Culpability
The next step in the analysis is to examine culpability of defendants.
Culpability is defined as blameworthiness.315 Aside from strict liability,
which is irrelevant in this field, tort law encompasses three general
categories of culpability: intentional, recklessness, and negligence.3 16
Intentional is a broad concept in torts, encompassing not only purpose, but
also knowledge or belief'3 17 Intent includes the actor who wishes to cause
the event in the sense of motive, and the one who believes that the
consequences are substantially certain to occur.318 It is a subjective standard
that inquires into the defendant's actual knowledge.319
Recklessness is the next level of culpability. The Restatement defines it
as when a defendant knows or has reason to know of facts which would
lead a reasonable person to realize that his act or intentional omission not
only creates an unreasonable risk of harm, but also that "such risk is
substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent."32 Some jurisdictions recognize recklessness as "quasi-intent"
culpability, often characterized by the descriptive "willful, wanton, and
reckless," which is a functional equivalent to the Restatement definition.32" '
The test of recklessness is more subjective than the test of negligence, but it
315. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (7th ed. 1999); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 552 (1993).
316. Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REv. 463, 471-72 (1992).
There is an argument that in between strict liability and negligence is "slight negligence," and
between negligence and reckless is "gross negligence." See id; Edwin H. Byrd, III, Comment,
Reflections on Willful, Wanton, Reckless, and Gross Negligence, 48 LA. L. REv. 1383, 1400-01
(1988). This article does not split these hairs, and will instead use intentional, reckless, and
negligent as the standard categories of a defendant's culpability.
317. Criminal law further distinguishes "intentional" between purpose and knowledge.
Simons, supra note 316, at 470-71 & n. 15. However, in torts, purpose and knowledge collapse
into the single category of intentional torts. Id at 471.
318. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). For example, in battery, "[i]t is
immaterial that the actor is not inspired by any personal hostility to the other, or a desire to
injure him." Id. § 13 cmt. c. Nevertheless, "intent" or "purpose" in the narrower sense of
"motive" plays a limited role in tort law. For example, the tort of malicious prosecution requires
that the defendant institute criminal proceedings against another "primarily for a purpose other
than that of bringing an offender to justice .. " Id. § 653(a) (1977).
319. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The
Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1133, 1143 (2001). But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (incorporating the "substantial certainty" standard).
320. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). In defining reckless, the Restatement
states that the harm is a "physical harm." For obvious reasons, physical harm is not applicable
here.
321. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 34, at 212-13 (noting that unreasonable
disregard of a known or obvious risk so great as to make it highly probable that harm would
follow).
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does not require specific awareness of a risk. It suffices that the defendant
had "reason to know., 322 Accordingly, recklessness has both a subjective
component (awareness of a potential for serious injuries) and an objective
component (conduct assessed as negligent). 32
3
Negligence is the next level of culpability. "Negligence is a failure to do
what the reasonably prudent person would do under" the circumstances.324
This person is a legal fiction,325 who embodies the "community ideal of
reasonable behavior, determined by the jury's social judgment" and
value.326 The law imputes the reasonably prudent person with the
wherewithal to foresee harm to a victim in all the permutations of
foreseeable consequences. The standard of conduct is objective,
representing the "ideal. 327
Although tort law recognizes a spectrum of culpability, courts have
compartmentalized intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress
theories for mental injury claims. The two theories exist not as two points
on a continuum of culpabilities, interests and remedies, but as discrete
divides where some foreseeable plaintiffs are remedied and many more
simply fall through the doctrinal cracks.
It is well settled that courts recognize claims for mental injuries when
they are the product of intentional and outrageous conduct.328 Although
"courts were initially reluctant to adopt the separate tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, 3 29 sometime around 1930 they began to
322. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12 (1965).
323. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 319, at 1143 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 500 (1965)).
324. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 32, at 175.
325. The reasonably prudent person is commonly described as "abstract," "hypothetical,"
and "mythical." For a discussion, see generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 32, at
174-75. See, e.g., Collins v. Altamaha Elec. Membership Corp., 260 S.E.2d 540, 541-42 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1979); Massey v. Scripter, 258 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Mich. 1977); Ryder v. Murphy, 124
N.W.2d 238, 240 (Mich. 1963); Trentacost v. Brussel, 412 A.2d 436, 440 (N.J. 1980);
Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982).
326. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 32, at 175.
327. A.P. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 9 (Methuen & Co., Ltd. 3rd
ed. 1928) ("He is an ideal, a standard, the embodiment of all those qualities which we demand
of the good citizen.").
328. Scholars, rather than courts, led the development of this tort. Daniel Givelber, The
Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 42, 42 (1982). Givelber cites
Magruder, supra note 58, and William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A
New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939), as the most influential articles. Id. at 42 n.1.
329. Melanie L. Carpenter, Note, Petersen v. Sioux Valley Hospital: Reckless Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 38 S.D. L. REv. 359, 370 & n.123 (1993) (citing Annotation, Modern
Status of Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress as Independent Tort: "Outrage," 38
A.L.R.4th 998, 1002-03 (1985)). Similar to claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
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recognize claims involving extreme and outrageous conduct.33 ° These
claims can be brought without meeting any artificial limitations or tests, and
a claimant need only show outrageous conduct that caused some mental
injury. 33
1
In an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, culpability is
the prime focus. The early law of intentional torts was concerned primarily
with preserving peace and social order rather than with protecting a right to
be free of mental injury.332 The modern law of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is probably less concerned with the dangers of social
disorder, but a plaintiff who shows extreme and outrageous conduct will
"seldom lose because the emotional distress is not severe enough. 333
Extreme and outrageous conduct has been defined as conduct that exceeds
all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, and of a nature especially
calculated to cause severe mental distress. 334 Where such unacceptable
conduct leads to injuries, the law imposes the full range of penalties which
is said to be punitive. 35 The extent of liability is great, including out-of-
pocket economic loss, damages for the injury, and potential punitive
damages. But courts are less concerned with the scope of exposure since
intentional infliction of emotional distress is almost always directed at a
particular individual or finite group of individuals and few in our society
engage in such outrageous conduct necessary to impose liability, and so
there is no issue of a wider exposure liability to the general populace.
these claims were cited for the difficulties in proving damages, fraudulent claims, and a "flood
of litigation." Id. at n. 124.
330. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 12, at 60. Petty insult or indignity lacks, from its
very nature, any assurance that the mental distress is genuine, serious, and reasonable. Id. at 59.
331. See Heidenreich, supra note 41, at 282. The Restatement has formulated a definition of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, which has been adopted by many jurisdictions: "one
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the
other results from it, for such bodily harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
Most jurisdictions have adopted functionally the same standard. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United
Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 438-39 (Minn. 1983) (recognizing intentional infliction of
emotional distress as an independent tort).
332. See THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 139-75,
353-78 (Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1956); Smith, supra note 220, at 194.
333. Pearson, supra note 28, at 486; see also Givelber, supra note 328, at 42-43 (stating the
action "in practice tends to reduce to a single element-the outrageousness of the defendant's
conduct").
334. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1972); Meyer v.
Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911, 918 (Iowa 1976); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
cmt. d (characterizing the standard as conduct that goes "beyond all possible bounds of decency
and.. . utterly intolerable in a civilized community").
335. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989).
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On the other hand, claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress
do not focus so much on the defendant's culpability. So long as the
defendant's conduct is deemed to be below the "ideal" standard, the focus
becomes whether the foreseeable plaintiff was injured in one of the defined
situational templates.336 The negligence could be slight, on par with
reaching for a cup of coffee in a car at precisely the wrong moment, but in
the eyes of the law the act would be sufficient to produce potentially great
liability for mental injuries unless the law steps in to limit such exposure.337
Yet the negligence could be patent, perhaps even bordering on recklessness,
but there is no liability absent a specific set of factual markers.
V. PROPOSED STANDARD
A. Generally Applicable Rules
Like other difficult areas of tort law, this field has been problematic
because the traditional framework breaks down under the factual
circumstances presented by these cases. Judicial and scholarly analyses
have tended to compartmentalize rules of liability and damage, and have
created an intellectual inertia, hindering critical analysis.338 In proposing an
alternative theory, this article lays out two benchmarks. One, any general
theory of liability should be neutral in principle, and its rules should apply
evenly to all segments of society. Two, the new theory should serve the
underlying policy considerations: weed out fraud and frivolity; limit
liability to socially tolerable levels; and allocate the social costs fairly
between plaintiff and defendant and among foreseeable plaintiffs.
Consistent with Judge Cardozo's suggested principles in Palsgraf,339 this
article proposes an analysis requiring a three-part calculus of (1) examining
the classes of plaintiffs interests, (2) weighing the defendant's culpability
against the interests affected, and (3) allowing rules of liability and damage
to apportion the risks in a balanced manner. The following set of generally
applicable rules is proposed. Because the class of direct victims is limited to
336. See supra Part II, pp. 813-31 and accompanying notes.
337. Miller observes that even those who are more sympathetic to compensating victims
may be disturbed by the imposition of liability disproportionate to blameworthiness. Miller,
supra note 37, at 19.
338. Cf Daniel A. Farber, Recurring Misses, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 727, 737 (1990) (discussing
the problem with scholarly analyses of increased risk harms and the problems of intellectual
compartmentalization of analysis). Miller is credited with attempting to jointly use rules of
liability and damage in this area. Miller, supra note 37.
339. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 43, at 289-90.
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a small group and their interests are of a higher order, claims can be
evaluated under generally accepted tort principles of duty, proximate cause
and damage. These mental injury claims are treated no differently than
physical injury claims. This has the benefit of a certain purity of principle
consistent with physical injury claims, including the provision of actual
damages.34 ° On the other hand, the class of collateral interests poses far
more difficult problems. The potential scope of exposure is broadly
distributed, amorphous, and unpredictable. Because the interest is of a lesser
normative order, a defendant's culpability should be higher to impose
liability. Such a heightened culpability requirement serves as a mechanism
to contain liability, resulting in liability proportional to culpability. For this
class of interest, a modification of both rules of liability and damage is
needed. Collateral victims are entitled to relief only if the defendant's
conduct is reckless or more, and damages should be limited to economic
losses.341
Culpability plays a significant role in determining the extent of the total
liability, which makes logical and practical sense.342 So long as a
defendant's conduct is merely negligent, the scope of exposure is limited to
direct victims, either physically or mentally injured. If the law stopped at
this point, few would argue that liability could be potentially infinite as the
340. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 903-905 (1965).
341. See id. §§ 904(2), 906. Miller was the first commentator to propose limiting damages
to economic losses. He advocated opening up the class of plaintiffs to all foreseeable plaintiffs,
but limiting all damages to economic losses. Miller, supra note 37, at 38-47. Subsequently,
Diamond also endorsed the concept of awarding only economic loss damages to all foreseeable
plaintiffs. Diamond, supra note 66, at 479-80. Miller noted that his proposal for limiting
damages to economic losses "may smack of irony" since the injury itself is not remedied, but
justified the approach based on reason and policy. Miller, supra note 37, at 40. This article
agrees with the approach and justification to the extent the limitation is applied to the class of
collateral victims. Moreover, there could be justification for allowing collateral victims full
remedies upon a finding of recklessness. See infra p. 882. But this article takes a more cautious
approach.
342. For a formulaic representation of the rules, liability operates under a three factor
calculus where a defendant's liability is a function of culpability and plaintiffs interests: L =f
[C(n,r) x V(d,c)], where C(n) x V(c) = 0, C(r) x V(c) = D(e), and C(n,r) x V(d) = D(a). The term
V(d,c) denotes the division of all foreseeable plaintiffs into direct and collateral victims; the
term C(n,r) denotes the division of negligence and recklessness; and the term D(a,e) denotes the
division of actual and economic damages. Because C(n) x V(c) = 0, we can anticipate that many
potential victims would be precluded from liability as a defendant's culpability would not
exceed simple negligence. Thus, scope of exposure and severity are limited significantly while
there remains the potential for remedies across the entire class of foreseeable plaintiffs. As
discussed, the formula to determine liability for physical injuries under the common law is: L =
I (Si + • •. + SN). The key difference between this and the above formulation is the interplay of
the defendant's level of culpability in determining total liability. This is the connection the
common law and academic commentary have not recognized.
[Ariz. St. L.J.
36:0805] PRINCIPLED SOLUTION FOR NIED CLAIMS
scope of exposure would not be a quantum greater than that for physical
injuries, and most would argue that the rule would be no more or less
arbitrary than the physical impact or zone of danger tests. In the larger
scheme of things, direct victims are not so much the concern. The focus of
the debate has always been: Why is the broad class of foreseeable collateral
victims not remedied?
My central thesis is that there is a relationship between culpability and
the different interests of the plaintiff.3 43 As the defendant's conduct slides
down the scale of culpability from intentional to negligent conduct, less
moral blame attaches, which should be accounted for in etching the limits of
liability.344 The proposal suggested here exposes a defendant to liability
only if her conduct is commensurate with the risks imposed on the
plaintiffs' various interests. Defendants then proportionally bear the risk of
injuries through adjustments in the rules of liability and damage.
In addition to the theoretical considerations, defining duty in this manner
is justified by the following practical considerations: (1) it limits liability,
(2) it is faithful to the principles of proportionality and fairness underlying
Anglo-American jurisprudence, (3) it borrows principles from well-
established tort causes of action and theories of remedy, and (4) it has a
symmetrical deterrence effect on defendants and plaintiffs.
343. This connection between culpability and a tortfeasor's relationship to the victim is
seen in a line of California post-Molien cases. In Bro v. Glaser, the California Court of Appeals
analyzed twenty-six post-Molien cases, and concluded that the appropriate test for determining
direct victim liability is a balancing of (1) whether a preexisting consensual relationship existed
between the victim and tortfeasor and (2) the degree of outrageousness in the tortfeasor's
behavior. 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 906 (Ct. App. 1994).
344. Ralph S. Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U.
PA. L. REv. 586, 588-92 (1933). I realize that, strictly speaking, an intentional tort does not
require a malicious intent to harm, the classic textbook case being Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W.
403, 404 (Wis. 1891). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A. But in most circumstances
where intentional conduct results in significant injuries, for example battery or intentional
infliction of emotional distress, a specific intent to harm or a callous disregard of the substantial
certainty of such harm is found. Cases of "innocent" intentional conduct resulting in severe
emotional distress are few and far between. As to intentional torts against property such as
trespass or conversion, the argument for some level of moral culpability is less evident. In any
event, such torts should rarely result in severe emotional distress by the very nature of the harm
absent compelling or aggravating circumstances such as insurance disputes, which typically
involve catastrophic or significant changes in one's life.
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B. Limitation of Liability
Although compensation remains a fundamental goal of accident law,345
compensation must stop when its burdens become disproportionately heavy
on defendants. We have seen that the policy of limiting liability and
unpredictability is the fundamental concern of the common law in this
field.346 At this point in the experience, the law has generally accepted the
conclusion that foreseeability does not adequately curtail either severity or
scope of exposure. Given this premise, if we believe defendants owe some
level of duty to all foreseeable plaintiffs, then as a matter of logical certainty
either the rules of liability or damage, or both, must be modified.
Of course, this argument is open to the criticism that it puts the cart
before the horse. If limiting liability was an end to itself and these rules are
a means to that end, they are no different from the common law rules. The
common law did modify the rules of liability by not recognizing liability
outside of certain situations for the specific purpose of limiting liability.
And there would be no credible criticism of the common law rules for
drawing the lines taken. 347 Any proposal for a general theory of liability
should find legitimacy outside of this circular argument, and limitation of
liability should be a litmus test for whether the proposed rules are practical
rather than whether they are principled.
C. Proportionality
When courts refer to "infinite" or "unlimited" liability,348 the references
are really shorthand for liability that is grossly disproportionate to the
345. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
294 (1970). Calabresi categorized the cost of accidents into primary, secondary, and tertiary
costs. Primary costs result directly from the injuries suffered in an accident. These include the
economic losses (e.g., medical bills, lost wages, etc.) and intangible damages such as pain and
suffering. Secondary costs are costs to society once an accident occurs. These costs include lost
productivity and deterrence effects on social behavior. Tertiary costs are costs associated with
the administration of the judicial process. Id. at 26-31.
346. See supra Part III.B, pp. 836-42 and accompanying notes.
347. In Pearson's view, the arbitrariness of the common law tests in fact served a legitimate
policy consideration. Pearson, supra note 28, at 484-85. He argues that common law tests are
more like traffic regulations because "[t]here are occasions in which a policy will suggest more
than one rule that will satisfy it, with no logical way of choosing between them." Id. at 482.
348. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 546, 557 (1994); Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 819 (Cal. 1989); Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1069-70 (D.C.
1990); Johnson v. Ruark Ob/Gyn Assoc., 395 S.E.2d 85, 99 (N.C. 1990) (Meyer, J., dissenting);
Wilder v. City of Keene, 557 A.2d 636, 638 (N.H. 1989); Kloepfel v. Bokor, 66 P.3d 630, 635
(Wash. 2003); Finnegan ex rel. Skoglind v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 666 N.W.2d 797, 802
(Wis. 2003).
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underlying culpability. Courts are not adverse to imposing high liability in
an absolute dollar sense, or liability having a severe relative consequence on
a defendant.349 Nor do defendants have some fundamental right to be free of
excessive liability in an absolute sense. 350 The concern is for fundamental
fairness. 35' Anglo-American jurisprudence abhors disproportionate
penalties.3 52 This is the central philosophy of crime and punishment.353 This
philosophy is reflected in the Constitution, which requires fundamental
fairness. The imposition of civil damages, too, must withstand
constitutional analysis and be proportional to the underlying culpability.354
The concern for fairness underpins tort doctrines as well.
355
A plaintiffs interest and her right to remedy are only parts of the
equation.356 A defendant, too, has a right to be free of disproportionate
punishment. In tort law, fairness is determined by weighing the liability to
the culpability. Negligent culpability is based on an objective standard of
care. The reasonably prudent person is "a fictitious person, who never has
existed on land or sea, 3 57 and no person can consistently live up to this
standard. It is largely a matter of fate that a moment's carelessness will
result in legal liability.358 Speaking in the context of claims for negligently
349. See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Liquidations Before and After Repeal of General Utilities,
21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 334 (1984) (stating liquidation is a corporation's death); Francis E.
McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1725 (2002)
(involving $54 billion in liabilities incurred for asbestos, and another $200 to $265 billion more
in the future) (citing STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE,
ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT 53, 77 (2002)).
350. Punitive damages impose excessive liability on a defendant, but they are a well-
established part of tort law. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 26 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating as far back as 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted,
punitive damages were part of the American common law of torts).
351. See Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 955 (1984) ("[N]otions of fundamental fairness...
are at the heart of Anglo-American law . .
352. Rabin, supra note 37, at 1534.
353. Id. at 1533-34. Proportionality analysis is required under the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. Courts must compare "the gravity of the offense,"
understood to include not only the injury caused but also the defendant's culpability, with "the
harshness of the penalty." Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
354. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 583 (1996) ("Comparing the
punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for
comparable misconduct provides a third indicium of excessiveness.").
355. For example, proportional liability is the central concept in the doctrine of comparative
negligence. See infra p. 876-77 and accompanying notes.
356. See Pearson, Response to Bell, supra note 66, at 416 ("I agree with Professor Bell that
psychic well-being is an important value. But that is where analysis should begin rather than
end.").
357. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 32, at 174.
358. For example, aside from freakish accidents and random happenstance, there will rarely
be an accident amongst the interactions of reasonably prudent persons. But in reality, most
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inflicted economic loss, Rabin observed that "it would make no sense to
hold a careless driver responsible for the massive economic losses suffered
when he brings traffic to a standstill in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel during
the rush hour." '359 It follows then, absent natural limitations like those found
in accidents producing physical injuries, the law must impose legal limits
on disproportionate liability when culpability is simply a failure to conduct
oneself to an unachievable standard of behavior.
Tort law must apportion liability "based upon conduct which is socially
unreasonable. 3 60 For mental injuries, a simple act of carelessness can lead
to disproportional liability as seen in the earlier hypothetical concerning the
negligent driver in a school zone.36' Where a negligent act primarily impacts
a small group of direct victims, the scope of exposure is limited. So while
severity may nevertheless be high, as may be the case with a physical injury
accident, liability is said to be commensurate with culpability. Outside of
this, the law can and should impose limitations where the scope of exposure
can be high, and so liability becomes disproportional in light of the
experience of the law in this field. If, however, culpability extends beyond
simple carelessness and a defendant's conduct is said to be in reckless
disregard of the safety of others, then a commensurate increase in exposure
to liability should naturally follow.
Consider again the earlier hypothetical of the negligent driver in a school
zone. 362 If the driver was speeding 60 mph, instead of 35 mph, and she was
aware that she was driving through a school zone with a 25 mph speed
limit, then it may not offend the notion of fairness if she is liable for the
physical injuries to the boy who was struck, the mental injury suffered by
his sister who was in the zone of danger, and economic losses to all other
foreseeable plaintiffs. Liability is reasonably capped to actual damages for
injuries to the boy and girl, and in addition whatever provable out-of-pocket
economic losses for all other foreseeable victims.
A natural order exists within the law of torts. The scope of exposure is an
inverse function of culpability. Victims of intentional infliction of injuries
people in the course of their lives will be involved in many accidents, one of the most common
being auto accidents.
359. Rabin, supra note 37, at 1536.
360. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 2, at 6.
361. See supra p. 839. "Thus, much of the behavior that is adjudged actionably negligent is
merely the product of ordinary human fallibility-'deficiencies in knowledge, memory,
observation, imagination, foresight, intelligence, judgment, quickness of reaction, deliberation,
coolness, self-control, determination, courage or the like'-in a complex and danger-laden
environment." Miller, supra note 37, at 19 (quoting Edgerton, Negligence, Inadvertence, and
Indifference: The Relation of Mental States to Negligence, 39 HARv. L. REV. 849, 867 (1926)).
362. See supra p. 839.
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are fewer in number than those of recklessness because few in our society
would engage in extreme and outrageous behavior that exceeds the bounds
of all human decency. In addition to the self-constraints of human decency,
the existence of a cause of action deters such conduct. Similarly, there is
less recklessness than negligence, which is commonplace. Culpability and
scope of exposure are naturally linked, and at each level of culpability the
law can assign liability proportionately and consistent with these natural
tendencies.
The rules of damage reflect a natural affinity toward proportionality.
Severity depends on two factors: (1) the extent of the actual damages
suffered and (2) the type of assessable damage. The extent of the actual
damages is a matter of (bad) luck and independent of culpability or scope of
exposure. The clearest example of this is the eggshell plaintiff rule. But
severity also depends on the type of assessable damages, which the law
controls. There are a number of rules that affect severity: damage caps,
multipliers, and comparative apportionment.363 These modifications have
little practical relevance. As discussed, caps and multipliers are generally
found in statutes and not in the common law scheme. In addition, a
comparative fault scheme has little application in mental injury cases.
Instead, proportionality in the rules of damages is incorporated into the
types of assessable damages, i.e., actual versus punitive damages. Punitive
damage is the most severe form of civil monetary penalty. It is reserved for
outrageous and unconscionable conduct. Intentional conduct carries with it
the greatest exposure to punitive damages. Recklessness in most cases
would not lead to excessive damages, 365 and a simple negligence action
should not result in punitive damages. This article then throws into the mix
economic loss damages, a portion of a plaintiff's actual damages. Therefore,
the layers of assessable damages can be used to award remedies
proportionally to defendant's culpability.3 66
363. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing caps and multipliers); see infra
pp. 876-77 (discussing comparative negligence).
364. Comparative negligence cases involve two active participants in an interrelated course
of conduct that results in an accident. While we can strain to imagine cases where comparative
fault could be at issue, the prototypical mental injury claim arises where a defendant's
negligence inflicts severe trauma on a passive victim either directly or derivatively.
Accordingly, comparative fault would have sporadic application at best.
365. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 9, at 40-41. Punitive damages are often
available for "reckless" conduct in at least one sense of that term-a "deliberate disregard of the
interests of others that the conduct may be called wilful or wanton." Id. § 2, at 10.
366. See Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 501 N.W.2d 788, 797 (Wis. 1993)
("The damage that negligence caused to Beacon Bowl is not out of proportion to the culpability
inherent in negligent conduct related to electricity.").
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Rules of probability also show a natural proclivity toward
proportionality. We expect that intentional conduct would more likely result
in a finding of liability as jurors would be naturally inclined to recognize
and punish outrageous conduct by finding liability.367 In the above example,
the driver recklessly driving 60 mph through a school zone will more likely
be found liable than the negligent driver. Negligence is a value judgment
that applies evolving community standards of the appropriate standard of
care.3 68 Many cases of negligence could be close calls.
The proposal here is consistent with these natural tendencies of
proportionality found in tort law. The rules of damage and liability should
reflect a weighing of the defendant's culpability and the plaintiff's interests.
These rules should be modified so that they relate to the scope of exposure.
In the realm of physical injuries, the rules of law do not make modifications
based on plaintiffs' interests. Rather, only the rules of damage are modified
based on level of culpability, in other words the imposition of punitive
damages for intentional torts. But mental injuries need an alternative legal
construct. The natural tendencies in tort law supporting proportionality
constitute the foundation for fundamental fairness, and achieving
proportionality requires adjustments in the rules of damage assessment. And
so damages are adjusted between the collateral and direct victim classes
according to the order of the interests, reflecting their relative importance.
Under the proposed classification of the universe of foreseeable
plaintiffs, the scope of exposure naturally increases as culpability decreases
from intentional to reckless to negligence. In other words, the size of the
potential class of victims is a function of the degree of culpability.
Conversely, the type of assessable damage is inversely related to the scope
of exposure as it decreases from punitive to general to economic damages
as culpability decreases. These two effects create a natural equilibrium that
works well in fairly apportioning liability and remedy. Incorporating this
equilibrium into the rule of law is not only consistent with tort principles,
but also has the effect of limiting aggregate liability proportionally. The
figure below schematizes the relationship among the plaintiffs' interests, the
defendants' culpabilities, assessable damages, and the scope of exposure.
367. "It is plausible, however, to assume that the likelihood of liability increases as a
defendant's behavior becomes more dangerous (that is, as its social costs increase)." John C.
Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards,
70 VA. L. REv. 965, 970 (1984) (positing that uncertainty affects people's incentives to comply
with the law).
368. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c.
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Culpability and Proportionality




Strict Liability / Negligence Reckless Infliction Negligent Infliction Intentional Infliction
(Collateral Victims) (Collateral Victins) (Direct Victinm)
Degrees of Culpability
There is an argument that assessable damage should be a function of
culpability, and not the scope of exposure. In other words, why do some
reckless defendants have less exposure in terms of assessable damages than
some negligent defendants when their culpability is higher? This is a fair
question. Ordinarily, the risk of punitive damage increases with greater
culpability. This general rule still applies for direct victims to the extent that
the cause of action is based on culpability sufficient to bring an intentional
or reckless infliction of emotional distress. As for collateral victims, this
general rule would not apply since damages are limited to economic losses.
Exceptions to a general rule are made when there is a separate policy reason
that outweighs the normal considerations of the rule itself. In this case, the
limit of economic losses is justified by an overarching policy consideration
of achieving proportionality and a normative proposition that the collateral
interest, while protected under circumstances of higher culpability, is
secondary and subservient to the direct interest. This exception is a
compromise in furtherance of providing a framework for broad based relief
while at the same time limiting liability to socially tolerable levels.
Furthermore, as discussed below, I believe there is a principled basis to
provide general damages to collateral victims, and this would be consistent
with the principles outlined in this article.369
A related concept to proportionality is equitable redistribution of
remedies. We can consider the assignment of liability as the expression of
preferences for the distribution of remedies. Apportioning liability between
defendants and plaintiffs is a zero sum proposition. Although less
categorical, the zero sum tendency applies as well between classes of
369. I do not suggest this extension, however, as a matter of experimental prudence. See
infra p. 877.
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plaintiffs to the extent that the available pool of remedies for various classes
of plaintiffs approaches intolerable limits.37 °
Under the common law, remedies are concentrated in a small group of
plaintiffs who meet its situational tests while all others are excluded as a
matter of law. Curiously, while many have directly criticized the allocation
of liability between plaintiffs and defendants, few have asked whether the
common law's remedy distribution is fair as among the plaintiff class. The
proposal here applies to all foreseeable plaintiffs, though neither recovery
nor the extent of recovery is assured. It has the effect of redistributing
remedies across the broader class of foreseeable plaintiffs. It would
probably not affect the aggregate liability to defendants under the current
state of the law, at least not materially so.3" Rather the greatest practical
effect of this proposal is that remedies are redistributed across a broader
class of victims. Many plaintiffs who would fail to qualify under the
common law tests would benefit, while the gains would be offset by a clear
shortfall for the common law bystanders.372 Under this proposal, the
interests of the bystanders as well as other bystanders who would not satisfy
the Dillon test are deemed to be collateral, and therefore access to and
availability of remedies are limited by the defendant's commensurate duty.
Nevertheless, the proposal is more equitable to the entire universe of
potential plaintiffs.
D. Precedent in Common Law
Recklessness has not been as important in tort law as intentional or
negligent conduct.373 This is perhaps because the doctrinal benefits are
outweighed by the difficulty of proving a higher standard of culpability,374
or because reckless culpability often gets subsumed into a negligence or
intentional action.375 Nevertheless, recklessness has its niche in certain
common law tort theories, one of the major ones being in the insurance
field. About half the jurisdictions recognize an independent tort of insurance
370. Obviously, if the available pot of remedies increases, all members of the plaintiff class
could benefit.
371. See infra Part V.G, pp. 881-82.
372. See infra Part V.G, pp. 881-82.
373. Simons, supra note 316, at 472.
374. Id.
375. In the majority of tort cases, liability turns on proof of intent or negligence, so that
recklessness is irrelevant marginalized as a distinctive scienter element. DOBBS, supra note 282,
§ 27, at 52.
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bad faith.37 6 While ordinarily a breach of a contract does not create a tort, a
bad faith cause of action is grounded in the unique relationship between
insurers and insureds.37 A bad faith action arises when an insurer breaches
the duty of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in all contracts, 378 and
such a breach is said to be reckless. This duty is contractual in origin, but
begets a tort cause of action because of the special nature of an insurance
arrangement.
In most jurisdictions that recognize bad faith actions, a defendant's
culpability must exceed a simple breach of contract lest the contract action
merges into a tort.379 In New York for instance, a bad faith action exists only
if the insurer's conduct is in "gross disregard" of the insured's interests,
exhibiting a conscious or knowing indifference. 3"0 This gross disregard
standard strikes a fair balance between two extremes by requiring more than
simple negligence and less than a dishonest motive.3"' The culpability
described here is similar to a reckless or quasi-intent state of mind.
Arizona has a different formulation of bad faith. A bad faith action arises
"when the insurer's conduct is 'consciously unreasonable"' (i.e., when its
improper actions permit an inference of imputed knowledge).38 2 The tort of
bad faith has been described as a "hybrid cause of action, sharing elements
of both a negligence action and an intentional tort., 38 3 The first element
requires a determination of whether the insurer's actions are objectively
unreasonable.3 84 The second element inquires into the defendant's state of
376. BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWTON, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE
DISPUTES, § 12.1, at 732-44 (10th ed. 2000).
377. Insurance policies are unique contracts in that they are purchased for protection
against calamity, and not for commercial advantage. See, e.g., Noble v. Nat'l Am. Life Ins. Co.,
624 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1981); Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 456 (Cal.
1979). Accordingly, some states have implied a fiduciary relationship; others have recognized it
as simply "special." See, e.g., Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571 n.3 (Ariz. 1986) (special
relationship); Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exch., 721 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1986) (fiduciary
relationship).
378. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967) (defining liability for
an insurer in bad faith actions).
379. See, e.g., Ward v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 106, 109 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)
(allowing insurers to deny claims if they are "fairly debatable").
380. Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 27-28 (N.Y. 1993) (holding
that insurers' conduct must constitute gross disregard of insured's interests).
381. Id. at 28.
382. Walter v. Simmons, 818 P.2d 214, 221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Trus Joist Corp.
v. Safeco Ins. Co., 735 P.2d 125, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)).
383. STEVEN PLITT, ARIZONA LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW § 5.1, at 250 (1998); see
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 319, at 1143 (stating reckless standard combines a subjective
component of awareness of risk and an objective standard applicable to the objective negligence
of the conduct).
384. PLITT, supra note 383, § 5.1, at 250.
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mind, whether the insurer knowingly or recklessly disregarded the interests
of the insured, a subjective standard.385
Insurance bad faith actions provide remedies where the contractual
damages alone do not make the plaintiff whole. The culpability requirement
is high because any lower level of culpability is mostly covered by the
underlying contract action. Although limited to insurance actions, we can
view bad faith as an example of an interstitial cause of action that provides
remedies across a spectrum of culpability (honest breach of contract,
negligence, reckless, and intentional conduct).386
We also see the modification of rules of liability and damage in the shift
from the doctrine of contributory negligence to comparative negligence. In
early common law, the negligence of the plaintiff that contributes to the
cause of her injury was an absolute bar to recovery.387 Contributory
negligence was justified by the argument that the plaintiff did not come
with "clean hands '388 or that the plaintiffs negligence was considered an
intervening event breaking the causal chain.3"9 Contributory negligence is
unfair because even though both parties were negligent, the plaintiff bears
the entire risk and consequence of mutual negligence.3 90 Typically,
"negligence constitutes mere inadvertence or inattention, or an error in
judgment, and it is unlikely that forethought" of liability was considered by
either party.391 In this regard, the doctrine of contributory negligence shares
an important characteristic with the common law rules for negligent
infliction of emotional distress: these rules of liability disproportionately
shift the risks to the plaintiff. The unfairness of contributory negligence is
385. Id.
386. Indeed, some jurisdictions allow recovery of damages for emotional distress as a part
of a bad faith claim. Jeffrey E. Thomas, Crisi v. Security Insurance Co.: The Dawn of the
Modern Era of Insurance: Bad Faith and Emotional Distress Damages, 2 NEv. L.J. 415, 427-
28 & n.99 (2002) (counting nine jurisdictions that routinely allow emotional harm damages,
including Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, and Texas).
387. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965); see generally Gary T. Schwartz,
Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978) (discussing
the rationale and limited efforts for a contributory negligence rule).
388. See, e.g., Davis v. Guarnieri, 15 N.E. 350, 360 (Ohio 1887).
389. See, e.g., Ware v. Saufley, 237 S.W. 1060, 1061-62 (Ky. 1922); Gilman v. Cent. Vt.
Ry. Co., 107 A. 122, 124-25 (Vt. 1919). In this vein, the argument is similar to the early
argument used to deny liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress claims.
390. Pearson, supra note 28, at 480-81. Pearson opines that the rule is "arbitrary because it
treats persons the same who ought to be treated differently by barring recovery for plaintiffs
found responsible for 100 percent of the causative negligence as well as those only slightly
negligent." Id. at 481.
391. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 67, at 469.
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"readily apparent,, 392 and since its inception the rule has been criticized for
its harshness.393
Prosser notes that as of 1982, some 40 states abolished the contributory
negligence doctrine in favor of the more equitable comparative negligence
rule.394 Instead of a rule of liability preclusion, these states apportion
liability through an adjustment of the rules of damage and liability.
395
Comparative negligence allocates liability based on a comparative
apportionment of culpability. 96 Under the pure comparative negligence
method, a defendant is only liable for the percentage of her fault. 397 This is a
pure rule of damage, and liability is not precluded at all. Under the modified
comparative fault method, the plaintiff can only recover if his fault is equal
or less than the defendant's, and his recovery is limited to the defendant's
percentage of fault.398 This rule involves both an adjustment to the rule of
liability and to the rule of damages.
There is a direct analogy to be drawn between the modified comparative
negligence rule and my proposal for collateral victims. Both involve an
adjustment to the rule of liability based on a measure of defendant's
culpability. Modified comparative negligence precludes liability when a
plaintiffs fault is equal to or greater than the defendant's; my proposal
precludes liability when defendant's culpability does not exceed simple
negligence. Moreover, both involve an adjustment to the rule of damages.
Modified comparative negligence caps plaintiffs recovery of damages to
defendant's culpability; my proposal caps damages to economic loss. By
adjusting the rules of liability and damage, the law of modified comparative
negligence more equitably apportions liability between defendant and
392. Id. at 468-69.
393. See, e.g., Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 281 N.W. 261, 263 (Minn. 1938)
(recognizing harshness of contributory negligence); see also Leon Green, Illinois Negligence
Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 36 (1944). See generally Charles L. B. Lowndes, Contributory
Negligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674 (1934).
394. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 67, at 471.
395. Contributory negligence was abolished both judicially and legislatively. See, e.g.,
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1232
(Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438-39 (Fla. 1973); PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 12, § 67, at 473 nn.39-40 (list of state statutes adopting comparative negligence).
396. Comparative negligence and comparative fault are not usually applied to intentional
torts. See David C. Sobelsohn, Comparing Fault, 60 IND. L.J. 413, 441 (1985). In addition,
assumption of risk, as a defense to torts of recklessness, negligence, and strict liability, is
sometimes viewed as analogous to the doctrine of consent in intentional torts. See Kenneth W.
Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: Theory of Full Preference, 67
B.U. L. REv. 213, 248-58 (1987).
397. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, § 67, at 472.
398. Id. at 473.
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plaintiff. The same can be said for the proposed rule here regarding
collateral victims.
E. Deterrence
There are two prominent strands of thought on the ultimate purpose of
tort law. Corrective theory of tort law posits that tort law is remedial and
that compensation for injuries is the primary goal.399 The deterrence theory
posits that tort law is regulatory and that deterrence and maximization of
social utility are the primary goals.4 °° Some have even tried to reconcile the
two.40' This article does not take a position on which is dominant (if there is
one). Nor does a specific discussion of the law of negligent infliction of
emotional distress provide a proper forum to explore these theories with a
more detailed analysis.40 2 But it should not ruffle any doctrinal feathers to
say that the optimal tort law should not only compensate the deserving
victims, but should also deter undesirable social behavior.4 3 One of the
fundamental goals of tort law is to prevent accidents through appropriate
deterrence.40 4 In this field, there are two behaviors that require deterrence.
First, defendants should be deterred from injuring plaintiffs. Second,
plaintiffs should be deterred from filing fraudulent and frivolous cases, and
perhaps even marginal ones as well.40 5 The proposal here has a symmetrical
deterrence effect on both defendants and plaintiffs.
For defendants, increased liability will not deter the negligent defendant.
It is the rare individual that constantly weighs the costs/benefits of every
ordinary act.40 6 Rather the lack of constant forethought results in everyday
399. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A
Comment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 113, 113-14 (1990); Ernest J.Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of
Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37, § 7-42 (1983).
400. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Corrective Justice in
Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981).
401. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence
and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997).
402. I merely propose the self-evident proposition that deterrence of wrongful conduct is a
good thing in society. Some commentators have suggested that tort law has indeed been
successful in deterring accidents. See, e.g., CALABRESI, supra note 345, at 69.
403. See Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARv. L. REV. 713, 713 (1965) ("I take it as given that the principal functions of
'accident law' are to compensate victims and reduce accident costs.").
404. See CALABRESI, supra note 345, at 26-27.
405. Only genuine and severe injuries should be compensated, and most borderline cases
would not involve such injuries or a tenuous connection between such an injury and a
defendant's conduct.
406. Pearson, Response to Bell, supra note 66, at 417.
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negligent accidents. To the extent that current accident laws seek
deterrence, most people are already on notice that any negligent conduct
could result in a lawsuit, and my proposal will probably have little or no
measurable effect on negligent defendants. The deterrence argument is more
plausible as culpability increases from the purely objective to subjective.
Under the common law scheme, regardless of how reckless a defendant acts
and so long as that conduct is not deemed extreme or outrageous, she is
shielded from liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and in
the realm of negligence the defendant is still shielded so long as the plaintiff
fails to fit within the common law situational templates. In this system, the
reckless and the negligent roam free with impunity subject only to limited
pockets of liability. It is .a scheme that does not consistently deter socially
undesirable conduct.4"7 Under the proposed rules here, all defendants are on
notice of potential widespread liability for reckless and intentional conduct.
Accordingly, it has a deterrent effect on a defendant who knows or has
reason to know his conduct is reckless.
For plaintiffs, the proposed rules deter the filing of frivolous, fraudulent,
or borderline claims. Claims by direct victims are more likely to be genuine
because the victims are closer in proximity to the wrongful conduct. Any
potentially fraudulent or frivolous claims can be dealt with by the rules of
evidence, procedure, and attorney supervision. As imperfect as these
methods may be, there is little danger of a large structural threat to the
integrity of the courts or public faith in the judicial system because the class
of plaintiffs is limited. The potential for fraud is greatest when the plaintiff
is not the direct victim of the defendant's conduct.4 °8
The court system is crowded with people who look to the law to
compensate for any intrusion into a perceived notion of a right to an
idealized sense of personal tranquility. The concern is less with outright
fraud, which is difficult to execute, than with the borderline case where
there is some disturbance to a person's tranquility arguably connected to a
negligent act.4"9 Marginal cases are the product of a plaintiff's subjective
conviction that she is entitled to compensation and an enterprising or
indiscriminant attorney's willingness to take a chance on such cases. These
cases test the limits of the law because they skirt the divide between
genuine injury and ordinary knocks in life. By granting only economic loss
damages to collateral victims, the question of fraud and frivolity naturally
dissipates. Trivial claims do not result in significant out-of-pocket economic
407. See, e.g., supra pp. 854-55 and notes 270-76.
408. Sandor & Berry, supra note 10, at 1254 & n.35.
409. See Pearson, Response to Bell, supra note 66, at 426 ("[T]he typical claim for
emotional harm would be trivial.").
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losses. Since there is no potential for the "homerun" case, there is no
incentive to sue absent severe mental injuries with concomitant economic
losses, which together serve as practical indicia of genuineness far better
than the common law's situational rules. It is unlikely that a charlatan or a
slightly injured victim and his lawyer would risk the vagaries and expenses
of a lawsuit to recover finite economic losses, which he must have incurred
to bring the lawsuit in the first place as an element of the cause of action.4" '
F. Potential Problem
An argument can be made that this proposal would swallow the
independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rather than
plead the more difficult intentional tort, plaintiffs may instead opt for the
negligence action.4 ' One commentator notes that if a broad based
negligence action is available there would be no incentive to plead the more
difficult intentional tort, thus eviscerating the intentional tort altogether.4"2
The Alaska Supreme Court considered this issue and reasoned that a
negligent infliction claim could render its intentional counterpart
meaningless. 4 3 The duplication or overlap problem, however, is more
illusory.
By definition, intentional infliction of emotional distress involves
conduct directed at a particular person (i.e., a direct victim). Where a
defendant's conduct is not extreme or outrageous, the negligent infliction
410. Miller argues that economic damages could still be a significant amount. Miller, supra
note 37, at 40. But there is the potential for a Catch-22 situation created by the limitation on
damages: a plaintiff could incur attorney's fees and costs that exceed the total economic losses,
making a lawsuit impractical. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 245-46 (1975) (discussing that under American rule, a prevailing party cannot recover
attorney's fees unless mandated by statute or contract); Bell, supra note 7, at 164 (noting the
problem of attorney fees); David T. Schaefer, Note, Attorney's Fees for Consumers in Warranty
Actions-An Expanding Role for the U.C.C.?, 61 IND. L.J. 495, 498 (1986) (explaining the
American rule of attorney's fees). It could be that an exception to the American rule on
attorney's fees is warranted, whether by judicial or statutory mandate, and that attorney's fees
and costs should be allowed to be pleaded as a part of the economic damages. Miller suggests
that attorney's fees need to be recoverable as a part of the damages. Miller, supra note 37, at 40
n.218. Notably, insurance bad faith torts are an exception to the American rule and allow the
recovery of attorney's fees and costs as a part of the compensable damages. See, e.g., Alyeska
Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 259 (allowing attorney's fees as damages); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d
565, 577 (Ariz. 1986) (same).
411. See supra pp. 863-65, for a discussion of the difference between negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress actions.
412. Crump, supra note 35, at 454-55.
413. Hancock v. Northcutt, 808 P.2d 251, 257-58 (Alaska 1991).
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claim would provide a legal remedy.414 For collateral victims, the remedy is
provided only upon reckless conduct. If there is an overlap or conflict with
current theory, it is here. The Restatement provides a Dillon-like bystander
rule (i.e., a collateral victim) for an intentional tort in a situation where a
plaintiff witnesses an immediate family member subject to extreme and
outrageous conduct.415 Under my proposal, the conduct need not be
intentional or outrageous, just reckless disregard of the potential for mental
injury, and the direct victim need not be an "immediate family" member.
Moreover, where extreme and outrageous conduct can be demonstrated,
the remedies are proportional to the culpability, and a defendant is subject
to the full panoply of punishments including punitive damages. The
possibility of punitive damages is a powerful incentive for defendants to act
responsibly, and for plaintiffs to pursue an intentional tort where facts
warrant. On the other hand, where a defendant's conduct falls short of this
ignominious measure, she may still be liable for a less culpable conduct
which may result in lesser liability. There is no conflict with or duplication
of an intentional tort. Rather, the proposal provides a spectrum of actions
across a broad range of culpabilities and injuries, and there are no gaps
where a defendant can escape liability as a matter of law for committing a
wrong. This is consistent with the principle that liability and remedy be
proportionally distributed.
G. Net Effect
How would this proposal affect the aggregate liability of defendants?
This is the ultimate practical question. Of course, there is no empirical data
or experience. I believe (educated guess is probably more accurate) that the
aggregate liability would be approximately the same or less even than under
the current common law inclusive of the Dillon bystander rule. There are
two effects at work here. First, the range of a defendant's duty of care is
broader. Direct victims not only include those satisfying the common zone
of danger and physical impact tests, but also a host of other plaintiffs who
would not be entitled to remedies under the common law.41 '6 The collateral
414. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 819 (Cal. 1989) (intentional torts
will support an award of damages for emotional distress alone in cases involving extreme and
outrageous conduct).
415. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965); see Bettis v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 334-35 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (interpreting the "immediate family" requirement
of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) for intentional infliction of emotional distress
to nieces and nephews under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976)).
416. See, e.g., Bogard v. Employers Cas. Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1985) (no
liability for negligent handling of an insurance claim); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 906
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victim class is larger than the common law bystander test as well. Those
who fail to satisfy the three-prong Dillon test could potentially recover,
including plaintiffs who fail to satisfy the spatial proximity test.4"7 Second,
duty owed and assessable damages are limited for a significant number of
potential plaintiffs. Bystander liability comprises the largest segment of
claims in this field. For this class, the standard of care is the more restrictive
standard of recklessness, which as noted before is less prevalent in conduct
and is more difficult to prove.4"8 Even if recklessness is proved, damages are
limited to recovery for economic loss. Thus, there is a significant offset
between the two effects of broadening the universe of plaintiffs and
restricting the standards of recovery.
The proposal here would probably result in no material change or would
slightly decrease the aggregate liability, but not by leaps and bounds. I also
add that a credible argument can be made within the analytical framework
of this article that victims of recklessness should be allowed recovery for
actual damages.4"9 In essence, the standard would be the same as the one set
forth by the Restatement's bystander rule for an intentional tort, less the
"immediate family" requirement.420 Additionally, if this were the case, the
argument for duplication and overlap would be far stronger as the difference
between reckless and intentional could sometimes be a hair's width.
Whether this expansion would tip the scale of proportionality is a question
of judgment and experience from the application of the proposed rules. It
could very well do so, and for this reason, my proposal stakes out a more
cautious middle ground. It remains to be seen whether this proposal will be
accepted by the collective intelligence of the legal marketplace, and whether
adjustments will be needed based upon the experience of the law.42" '
S.W.2d 124, 130 (Tex. App. 1995), rev'd 945 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. 1997) (holding no liability
for negligent disclosure of sexually explicit photos). The field of insurance bad faith is
potentially a major area in which negligent infliction of emotional distress could apply. See
Bauman, supra note 35, at 720; Thomas, supra note 386, at 433-41.
417. See supra Part II.B, pp. 818-24.
418. For non-bystanders who fail to satisfy the temporal or spatial proximity elements,
there would also be an evidentiary problem that would work as a natural barrier against
recovery. Because these plaintiffs were not at the accident and did not contemporaneously
witness it, evidence must be gotten from the direct victim, if he survived, or from other
witnesses. Proving recklessness without direct testimony from the plaintiff would be a quantum
more difficult.
419. Additionally, this article has not explored the possible use of evidentiary rules,
particularly the standards of proof, as a means to achieve a principled proportionality. I did not
do this because the modifications of damages would achieve similar results and would in fact
serve as a better deterrent.
420. See supra p. 881 and accompanying notes.
421. For this ambivalence, I take shelter in Holmes' observation: "The life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1
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VI. CONCLUSION
The law of negligent infliction of emotional distress exists today in an
uneasy state of judicial resignation. Like a mediocre meal, it is decidedly
unsatisfactory but one that must be taken for lack of choice. Courts and
scholars know that the current rules of law are arbitrary, and that is the
problem. Arbitrary results are an anathema to Anglo-American
jurisprudence. Cases giving rise to genuine, foreseeable mental injuries are
legion. They do not simply arise in the context of the common law's
situational templates. If they did, this field of law would not have produced
so much debate. They can arise in the context of commercial and personal
relationships, relationships created by fact or law, ordinary accidents,
foreseeable accidents, mass toxic tort catastrophes, exposure to disease and
other infinite possibilities of chance and bad luck that connect various
people in the mystery we call life. Many fortuities will not fit squarely
within the common law tests, and thus their claims will be precluded as a
matter of law for no other reason than the rules are the rules.
While the common law rules serve the important policy consideration of
limiting liability, they do so without principle and appropriate weighing of
other policies. For this reason, they are arbitrary. Early courts could rely on
such venerable concepts as judicial restraint and stare decisis to deny new
or untested theories of liability. But the social expectations of compensation
and protection for mental tranquility have progressed and the genie cannot
be put back in the bottle. The myriad of issues and policies in this area have
been vetted by a hundred years of case law and scholarly analyses, and
courts today should pick up the pieces and construct a principled approach
that is not so "arbitrary" and yet so "limitless."
Where traditional analysis fails to properly weigh the competing policies,
an alternative is required to construct a more principled approach to the
problem. Such an alternative theory must avoid defining duty in the context
of an all-or-arbitrary choice. Foreseeability and genuine injury should be
prerequisites to recovery, rather than the definition of recoverability.
Reasoned distinctions are needed to provide satisfactory solutions to this
complex social problem. This article suggests that duty be defined as a
relationship between a plaintiff's interest and a defendant's culpability. This
approach balances the competing interests, and provides a uniform, value
neutral approach for these claims. There are several key benefits of this
approach: it provides potential remedies across the universe of foreseeable
plaintiffs; it limits liability to predictable levels; it satisfies the principle of
(1881). Only experience will show whether this article will find acceptance in whole or in part
in the legal marketplace, or whether it will be relegated to the obscurity of dusty law stacks.
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proportionality and fairness; and its principles borrow from other time-
tested concepts of tort law. Thus, the approach is based on sound principles
and policies, and the rules can be practically applied.
The proposal is not without drawbacks. For collateral victims, the notion
of duty is far more restrictive and available remedy is partial. The practical
import is that the price for enlarging the class of total plaintiffs is paid with
higher barriers to recovery and remedy. Collateral victims are precluded
from recovery unless the defendant's conduct is reckless, a high level of
culpability is present, and remedy is limited to economic losses. A large
segment of the cases in this field arise from a bystander context. Many
claims for injuries would not involve reckless conduct or proof of such
conduct would not be available and so many could go without remedies. For
this reason, proponents of bystander liability based on a negligence standard
of care will no doubt criticize this approach. But I reiterate that no proposal
in this area is ideal as apportioning liability will always be a zero sum
allocation.
The ultimate policy choice for the courts is whether they can
countenance Dillon-type "closely related" plaintiffs (i.e., parents and
siblings) going without remedies when the defendant's conduct is merely
negligent. This article suggests an alternative choice. The unfortunate
economics is that every proposal in this area of law will be flawed from the
standpoint of remedying genuinely injured, foreseeable plaintiffs. Tort law
not only referees the transactions between plaintiffs and defendants, but also
between potential plaintiffs who must share the available pool of remedies.
There are only solutions that are more optimal, in principle and in practice,
serving the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and society more equitably.
My proposal is the tradeoff necessary for a principled theory of recovery in
an imperfect world.
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